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Abstract:  This paper explores the tortured history of developing countries’ pursuit of access to 
affordable generic medicines that they are unable to produce efficiently on their own.  Having lost 
rights to treat medicines as essential commodities and as generalized exceptions to patent 
protections in the WTO TRIPS Agreement, developing countries and public health activists 
temporarily reasserted the primacy of health over profits in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health in November of 2001.  However, since most developing countries 
lack meaningful pharmaceutical capacity to manufacture medicines efficiently on their own, they 
needed flexibility to import medicines from countries with robust generic industries, especially 
since important exporting countries like India will soon loss their right to routinely reverse-
engineer and manufacture pharmaceutical products for export.  Thus, Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration mandated that member states negotiate an efficient mechanism for producing 
medicines for export/import, a mandate that was honored in the breach by delayed adoption and 
by an overly restrictive and procedurally burdensome set of requirements imposed by the August 
30, 2003, Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.  This paper outlines the many mechanisms 
that developing countries have to secure generic medicines produced, under compulsory licenses 
and otherwise, and explores in detail the arthritic flexibilities of the August 30 Agreement.   
In addition to analyzing largely theoretical sourcing options, the paper recommends pragmatic 
legislative reform in developing countries aimed at maximizing intellectual property flexibilities 
under the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and the Paragraph 6 Implementation 
Agreement.   More controversially, the paper recommends that developing countries implement a 
more vigorous competition policy slanted towards the granting of compulsory licenses and the 
regulation of voluntary licenses.   The paper contextualizes a developing country’s decision of 
whether to invest in and perhaps subsidize domestic production with the “lowest-cost” 
procurement requirements of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria and with a brief 
analysis of economies-of-scale in pharmaceutical manufacture.  Finally, the paper urges 
developing countries to resist efforts to expand drug companies’ intellectual property rights in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements and instead argues that countries should continue to 
pursue a short-term strategy of exporting life-saving medicines pursuant to the Article 30 limited 
exception rule in the TRIPS Agreement and a long-term strategy of rolling back patent protects 
and data exclusivity rules for pharmaceutical products.  Too many lives are at stake, most 
obviously people living with HIV/AIDS, to let the U.S., the E.U., and Japan, and the 
pharmaceutical industries that they represent, succeed in extending pharmaceutical hegemony.
________________________
*  Northeastern University School of Law, member Health Global Access Project, b.baker@neu.edu. 
This article was originally commissioned by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Project, 
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41.  CONTEXT – DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ NEED FOR ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL ON-
PATENT MEDICINES FOR TREATING HIV/AIDS AND OTHER DISEASES
As recognized by the U.N. Millennium Development Goals Project, the burden of untreated, but 
treatable disease in developing countries is staggering.1  For example, over 40 million people are 
living with HIV/AIDS, including nearly 27 million in Africa,2 precipitating a global emergency3
far overshadowing the SARS scare or the war on terror.  Although millions of people living with 
AIDS in developing countries need immediate access to affordable antiretroviral medicines, 95% 
of them, including 99% in Africa, are living – and dying – without medicines that have 
dramatically extended lives in the U.S. and Europe.4  AIDS is the paradigmatic example, but the 
issue of access to on-patent essential medicines is not limited to HIV/AIDS or antiretrovirals 
(ARVs) alone.  Poor people in developing countries face a host of infectious diseases, e.g., 
tuberculosis, malaria, respiratory infections, diarrhea, and chagas disease, for which there is little 
or no access to medicines, even where cures exist.  In addition to infectious diseases, people in 
developing countries contract many, more familiar and equally untreated diseases including 
diabetes, asthma, heart disease, cancer, and mental illness.5  For these diseases, as common in the 
North as the South, there is a wider array of on-patent medicines, including anti-diabetics, beta-
blockers, oncology drugs, and psychiatric drugs, all of which are critically important to the 
physical and mental health of poor people in developing countries and all of which are priced 
well beyond affordability.  
It is against this backdrop of millions of lives lost needlessly every year that one must judge the 
world’s hesitant and often counter-productive response to the AIDS pandemic and other health 
problems in developing countries and applaud the growing movement to catalyze a robust trade in 
low-cost generic medicines.  The enormous gap between the need for access to affordable on-
patent medicines and its realization reflects a disconnect between the perceived interests of rich 
countries in the global North, including the highly profitable proprietary pharmaceutical 
companies6 that research, develop, and produce patented medicines, and the interests of 
1
 United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000):  Goal 6:  Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other disease, 
targets:  have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence and spread of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, and other major diseases.
2
 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic Update:  December 2003, 5.   
3
 WHO declared HIV/AIDS a global emergency on September 22, 2003.  WHO Fact Sheet 274, 
<http://www/int.mediacentre/factsheets/2003/fs274/en/print/html> (September 2003).  At the Barcelona 
International AIDS Conference in July of 2002, WHO committed to treating 3 million people living with 
AIDS by the end of 2005.  
4
 Six million people living with HIV/AIDS in developing countries need immediate access to affordable 
medicines or they will die within two years.  Despite this compelling need, only 300,000 developing world 
patients are receiving antiretroviral therapy including 50,000-75,000 in all of Africa. One-third of the 
developing country total was being treating in Brazil, which provides universal free access to ARV therapy.  
WHO, A Commitment to Expanded Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment, 1 <http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/arv/
who_hiv_2002_24.pdf> (Dec. 2002); see Jane Galvão, Access to antiretroviral drugs in Brazil, 
<http://image.thelancet.com/extras/01art9038web.pdf> (Nov. 5, 2002).
5
 “Noncommunicable diseases such as cardio-vascular diseases, cancer and diabetes are clearly on the 
increase in African countries. According to the WHO Regional Office for Africa, if this situation is not 
contained, sixty percent of deaths in the Region by the year 2020 will be caused by NCDs, compared to 
forty-one percent in 1990.”  WHO, Non-communicable diseases:  Regional Strategy for 2000-2010, 28 
August – 2 September 2000.  <http://www.afro.who.int/press/2000/regionalcommittee/rc5006.html>.
6
 Pharmaceuticals have ranked as the most profitable sector in Fortune 500 rankings for the past three 
decades.  The top ten U.S. drug makers increased their profits by 32% from $28 billion in 2000 to $37 
billion in 2001.  Together these ten companies report profits of 18.5 cents for every dollar of sales, eight 
5developing countries in the global South that require life-saving medicines to fight HIV/AIDS 
and other pandemics that are decimating their poverty-stricken populations.  This disconnect 
occurs at the juncture of national and international intellectual property regimes, especially the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS),7 national and regional capacities to manufacture and market 
pharmaceutical products efficiently, and global patterns of income inequality and poverty.  While 
rich developed countries continue to pursue intellectual property protections and trade rules 
designed to guarantee incentives for discovery and profits for the proprietary pharmaceutical 
industry, there is a critical lack of access to medicines essential to counteract disease and to lower 
the body count of poor people in Africa, Asia, South America, and other developing regions.
Developed countries often promote enhanced intellectual property rights, including those of 
pharmaceutical producers, as important to development, where the rising tide of import-export 
economies will rehabilitate failed public health sectors and intellectual property protection will 
promote local research and development of medicines for diseases primarily found in Africa, 
South America, and Asia.  An alternative solution, pursued by developing countries and treatment 
activists internationally, is the promotion of efficient generic production by a sufficient number of 
manufacturers at meaningful economies-of-scale so that medicines can be accessed at lowest cost.  
To enable trade in generic medicines, developing countries and pro-public health activists have 
launched a broad-based attack on intellectual property rights that hamstring developing countries’ 
ability to respond proportionately to their urgent crises and more prosaic public health needs by 
making treatment costs prohibitive.  
That generic medicines are cheaper than their brand-name, patent-protected counterparts is 
undeniable.  For example, in February of 2001, Cipla of India announced a price heard round the 
world – a standard package of ARVs for as little as $350/year to NGOs and $600/year to 
governments in Africa.8  As more Indian producers entered the market, prices fell even further, 
and the quality of the drugs was assured through the World Health Organization’s new pre-
qualification program.  This fall, a new benchmark price has been established by four generic 
producers, three Indian and one South African – less than $140 per year for the WHO preferred 
fixed-dose combination medicine.9  Accordingly, standard quality generics are now available for 
a penny on the dollar of what the major pharmaceutical companies charge in rich markets.10
To enable purchase of assured quality generic drugs, developing countries and activists have also 
succeeded in convincing donors to establish funding structures such as the Global Fund to Fight 
times higher than the median for all Fortune 500 industries.  Scott Gottlieb, Drug Companies Maintain 
“Astounding” Profits, 324 B.M.J. 1054 (May 4, 2002).  
7
 Art. 8(1), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf>  (1994).  
8
 Donald G. McNeil Jr., Indian Company Offers to Supply AIDS Drugs at Low Cost in Africa
New York Times, Feb. 7, 2001<http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/health/07AIDS.html>.
9
 Mark Schoofs, Clinton Program Would Help Poor Nations Get AIDS Drugs, Wall Street Journal (October 
23, 2003).
10
 Major pharmaceutical companies have offered price discounts through the WHO co-sponsored 
Accelerating Access Initiative.  However, this Initiative has gotten off to a painfully slow start such that 
only 36,000 additional patient received medicines between May of 2000 and March of 2002.  WHO & 
UNAIDS Progress Report, Accelerating Access Initiative:  Widening access to care and support for people 
living with HIV/AIDS 1-2 (June 2002).   Although the figure has now risen to 76,300 people, the conditions 
that companies impose and the requirement for country-by-country, drug-by-drug negotiations have 
resulted in a widening, not narrowing, gap in access to treatment. 
6AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria11 [Global Fund] and in agitating for greatly enhanced bilateral 
and multilateral donations so that there are reliable and sustainable reservoirs of purchasing 
power sufficient to provoke generic entry and to finance purchase of large quantities of medicine.  
In this regard, the promised tripling of the U.S. response to global AIDS, from $5 billion over 
five years to $15 billion, may be significant12 as is the $1 billion commitment to date from the 
World Bank’s Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program.  Although the WHO Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health recognizes the centrality of funding for AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria in the fight against global disease, it advocates spending $34 billion a year by 2007 on 
both general and targeted health care programs in developing countries.  With this level of 
funding, the world can begin to reverse the tide of disease, prevent 8 million deaths a year, and 
generate $360 billion in economic benefits a year. 
Developed-country trade policy and pursuit of enhanced intellectual property rights have 
complicated a viable response to HIV/AIDS and other diseases where patented medicines are too 
expensive for poor countries to purchase.  In place of an energetic global reaction speeding 
medical care to developing countries, the U.S. and its European and Japanese allies have enforced 
a protectionist system of intellectual property protections that frequently keeps low-cost drugs 
from people in need.  This system, designed primarily to preserve drug companies’ exclusive 
access to private sector markets in middle-income developing countries, often forestalls access to 
dramatically cheaper generic medicines for people in immediate need.
The prime example of this imbalanced sense of priorities occurred in multilateral negotiations 
that established a uniform system of international intellectual property rights, the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement.  But even after securing a new international standard of patent protection in the 
GATT negotiations, the U.S. continued to pursue its goal of heightened intellectual property 
protections through an ongoing series of trade sanction threats, its stubborn resistance in WTO 
negotiations aimed at liberalizing access to medicines, and its pursuit of bilateral and plurilateral 
negotiations designed to “ratchet” intellectual property protections to an even higher level.13
Section 2 of this paper presents a critical analysis of the U.S.’s continued defense of drug 
company prerogatives and of its multi-forum efforts to achieve even higher levels of intellectual 
property protection.  Concurrently, Section 2 reviews the struggle of developing countries to 
codify greater recognition of public health issues and to engineer increased intellectual property 
flexibilities, a struggle that reached its high point in Doha, Qatar, on November 14, 2001 when 
the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health [the Doha 
11
The concept for an international funding mechanism to fight HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria began at 
the Okinawa G8 Summit in July 2000. At the urging of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and 
many national leaders, the concept of the Fund was unanimously endorsed in June 2001 at the first 
UN General Assembly Special Session to focus on HIV/AIDS. In July 2001 at its meeting in 
Genoa, G8 leaders committed US $1.3 billion to the Fund. 
The Global Fund to Treat AIDS, TB, and Malaria:  FAQ <www.globalfundatm.org/faq_gfund.html> (Feb. 
2002).
12
 The Bush administration has sent mixed messages about whether it will allow purchases of lowest costs 
generics or preferred proprietary drugs in its new initiative, see subsection 5.2, infra.  
13
 Peter Drahos, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, Oxfam Cost of Medicines Campaign  
<http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/bilateralism_ip.htm> (2001) (discussing the U.S. 
strategy of using bilateral and regional forums to establish higher intellectual property protections which it 
then pursues in larger regional and international trade negotiations). 
7Declaration].14  Although the Doha Declaration confirmed member states’ freedom to issue 
compulsory licenses and to rely on parallel imports as an alternative source for lower-cost 
branded medicines, it left open sourcing issues for poor countries that cannot produce medicines 
efficiently through domestic manufacture because of insufficient or inefficient pharmaceutical 
capacity.  For these countries, local production is impossible and importation from exporters is 
increasingly restricted because of a requirement in TRIPS that countries bypassing patent rights 
for particular medicines must produce predominately for their own domestic markets rather than 
for export.  Thus, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration required a resolution to the production for 
export dilemma by the end of 2002.  Despite this deadline, U.S. intransigence resulted in impasse 
at the end of 2002, necessitating anther nine months of negotiation. Finally, on August 30, 2003, 
WTO members unanimously approved the Decision of 30 August 2003:  Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health [Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement].15
Section 3 of this paper, its major section, summarizes the August 30, 2003 compromise on the 
Paragraph 6 dilemma and then outlines in detail the multiple options that developing countries 
have for accessing medicines from willing producers under the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha 
Declaration, and the new August 30 Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.  Section 4 of the 
paper then outlines the breadth of legislative reform that developing countries must enact in order 
to take advantage of the entire range of flexibilities that they now have.  Because developing 
countries with marginal pharmaceutical capacity will still face questions about whether to invest 
in or subsidize local generic manufacturing or to import essential medicines from abroad, Section 
5 of the paper provides a brief economic analysis of the prerequisites of efficient generic 
manufacture and the special importance of economies-of-scale in securing lowest prices.  Section 
6 discusses procurement policies of the Global Fund to Fight AID, Tuberculosis and Malaria and 
of unilateral initiatives such as the U.S. Emergency Program for AIDS Relief [EPAR]that might 
impact sourcing decisions.  
Gains achieved in the Doha Declaration and in the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement risk 
being undermined because of the negative impact of bilateral and plurilateral free trade 
agreements being negotiated by the U.S. with individual developing countries and with 
developing regions.  Thus, Section 7 of the paper highlights negative aspects of recent U.S. free 
trade agreements and other trade and intellectual property initiatives.  This section recommends 
that developing countries insist on removing intellectual property provisions from bilateral and 
plurilateral trade agreements and that the TRIPS Agreement should now be seen as both a floor 
and a ceiling on IPRs.  Finally, in Section 8, the paper argues for a simplified Paragraph 6 
solution and attempts to persuade developing country negotiators that they should not settle for 
the flawed Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement during their upcoming negotiation to amend 
the TRIPS Agreement on a permanent basis.  In particular, the paper argues that developing 
countries should return to a simplified Article 30 solution that put them on equal footing with 
large, rich countries that can routinely satisfy their compulsory licensing needs through no-hassle, 
no-limits domestic production.
14
 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session, Doha, 
Nov. 9-14 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001).  
15
 WT/L/540 (September 2, 2003).
82.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION NEGOTIATIONS:
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, AND DOHA DECLARATION, AND THE PARAGRAPH 6 
IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT. 
2.1  :  The WTO TRIPS Agreement
The 1994 TRIPS Agreement introduced minimum global standards for protecting and enforcing 
nearly all forms of intellectual property rights:  patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, including 
those applying to pharmaceuticals.16 The Agreement was the result of a decade-long movement 
by a coalition of industries in the U.S. that united to secure an international standard of 
intellectual property protections that could be enforced through trade sanctions.  Frustrated by the 
inability of the World Intellectual Property Organization to engineer global standardization and 
harmonization of IP standards, the pharmaceutical, computer software, publishing, and 
entertainment industries in the U.S. cooperated to form their own internal alliances and to lobby 
business groups to back enhanced intellectual property protections.  This strengthened U.S. 
alliance then worked with industry leaders and networks in other developed countries to motivate 
the importance of globalizing IP protections.  At the same time that they were cementing their 
intercontinental business alliances, these forward thinking industries convinced first the U.S. 
Trade Representative and then the E.U. and Japanese trade representatives that GATT was the 
forum within which intellectual property protections should be pursued.  Although developing 
countries tried to create a coalition of the unwilling, the U.S. used its new Section 301 Special 
Trade List IPR authority to discipline recalcitrant nations and to the split the alliance.  Reacting to 
competition from generic producers, the U.S. and E.U. pharmaceutical industry played a lead role 
in TRIPS negotiations.17 At the end of the day its principal negotiator stated that the industry had 
achieved all of its aims, controlling the process and the content.18
The resulting TRIPS Agreement covers basic principles, standards, and use of patents, 
enforcement and dispute settlement mechanisms, and multiple other subjects, many of which are 
tilted in favor of intellectual property owners and against the interests of consumers.  Under its 
key patent provisions, member countries must provide patent protection for a minimum of 20 
years from the filing date of a patent application, Article 33, for any invention, including a 
pharmaceutical product or process, that fulfils the criteria of novelty, inventive step and 
usefulness, Article 27.1.  Although preceding patent-rule pluralism in both the developed and 
undeveloped world had allowed policy-based discrimination between fields of invention, for 
example by excluding medicines, Article 27.1 expressly outlawed such discrimination.  Similarly, 
16
 For a detailed history of the political and strategic genesis of the TRIPS agreement as engineered by U.S. 
knowledge industries, see Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism:  Who Owns the 
Knowledge Economy (New Press, New York, 2003).  For a detailed and technical analysis of the 
background and main policy issues of TRIPS, see UNCTAC/ICTSD Capacity Building Project on 
Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development, TRIPS and Development:  Resource Book (Oct. 
2002).  For a discussion of the flexibilities available to developing countries re TRIPS-compliant 
implementation, see Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in 
Developing Countries (South Centre, Geneva, 2000).  For a discussion of the impact of the TRIPS 
Agreement and access to medicines, see Karin Timmermans & Togi Hutadjulu, The TRIPS Agreement and 
Pharmaceuticals: Report of an ASEAN Workshop on the TRIPs Agreement and its Impact on 
Pharmaceuticals, <http://www.grain.org/docs/asean-tmk-en.pdf> (May 2-4, 2000); Michael Bailey, Ruth 
Mayne & Dr. Mohga Smith, Fatal Side Effects: Medicine Patents under the Microscope, 
<http://www.oxfam.org.ul/cutthecost/downloads/policy3.rtf> (Feb. 2001) [Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects].
17
 Oxfam, Fatal Side Effects, supra note 17, at 38.
18
 “In the words of Edmund Pratt of Pfizer, ‘Our combined strength enabled us to establish a global private 
sector-government network which laid the groundwork for what became TRIPS.’” Id.
9it was no longer permissible to discriminate routinely against imports in favor of locally produced 
products, thus allowing major pharmaceutical companies to control the place of production 
despite illusory promises to undertake technology transfer.19  Because of Article 28, the major 
pharmaceutical producers secured exclusive rights to exclude others from “making, using, 
offering for sale, selling, or importing” patented pharmaceutical products or products made with a 
patented process. In addition, Article 39.3 protects undisclosed information (including clinical 
test data) from “unfair commercial use,” a provision that may ultimately be interpreted to impede 
registration of generic drugs even where patent bars are overcome.20
Admittedly, there are important flexibilities in TRIPS, discussed in detail in Section 3, including 
autonomy under Article 6 to establish international exhaustion rules, which would thereby permit 
parallel importation21 and authority under Article 31 to issue compulsory licenses22 and under
Article 30 to grant limited exceptions to patent holders’ right to exclude competition,23 but the 
undeniable effect of the TRIPS agreement has been to consolidate the economic power and 
monopoly privileges of the proprietary drug industry.  Given its pre-existing advantage in 
conducting research and development (96% vs. 4%), the developed world’s drug industry secured 
near absolute competitive advantage over the developing world’s via the TRIPS Agreement.24
This advantage will eventually result in the net transfer of billions of dollars from the 
impoverished Global South to the affluent Global North.
At the time of its passage, many public health specialists in both developed and developing 
countries seemed unaware of the looming consequences of a rising tide of patent protection on 
the treatment of diseases.25  However, the burgeoning AIDS crisis quickly caught people’s 
attention, especially given the astronomical cost of triple-therapies brought to the market in the 
mid-1990’s.  As the developing world confronted the reality of tens of millions of HIV infections 
and the unaffordability of billions of patent-protected pills, critics questioned the deal that had 
been struck in the Uruguay Round.  Early critics were joined later by more mainstream sources, 
many of whom offered their own critique of intellectual property fundamentalism, including the 
19
 “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology … .”  Article 7.  Shortly after 
the adoption TRIPS, a number of developing countries lost a significant number of pharmaceutical facilities 
including Chile and South Africa.
20
 For an extended discussion of options concerning appropriate use of undisclosed data, see Carlos Correa, 
Protection of Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals:  Implementing the Standards of the 
TRIPS Agreement  (South Centre, 2002).  The ability of generic producers to compare generic drugs against 
previously registered medicines to establish bio-equivalent and comparable bio-availability is crucial to 
avoid cost-prohibitive, time consuming, and wasteful duplication of clinical trials.
21 See discussion, infra, subsection 3.2.2.
22 See discussion, infra, subsections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.
23 See discussion, infra, subsection 3.2.6.
24
 World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000, Table 5-12.
25
 There is little doubt that the U.S. and European negotiators were intimately aware of the cost 
implications of the expanded patent protections – they were negotiating at the bequest and often with the 
assistance of representatives of the pharmaceutical industry.  Likewise, India and Brazil seemed 
knowledgeable about the future impacts of the agreement, but a divide and conquer strategy by the U.S. 
undermined a potential developing country alliance that opposed grafting monopoly-based intellectual 
protections on top of a multilateral “free trade” agreement.  The main tool that the U.S. used in splitting the 
incipient alliance was Special 301 Lists and threats of trade sanctions under 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2002), 
which was amended in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 to include close surveillance 
of IPRs.  For a history this use of bilateral threats, see Drahos with Braithwaite, supra note 17, at 85-107.
10
prestigious U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights,26 the UNDP,27 the World Bank,28
UNTACD/ICTSD,29 and even the WTO itself in collaboration with the WHO.30
Even after codifying a universal and higher standard of patent protections for the pharmaceutical 
industry in the TRIPS Agreement, the U.S. continued its existing pro-PhRMA31 trade policy by 
threatening developing countries such as Thailand,32 South Africa,33 and Brazil34 with trade 
26 Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (London 2002). 
27 Human Development Report 2001:  Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (Oxford 
University Press, New York and Oxford, 2001).
28 Intellectual Property:  Balancing Incentives with Competitive Access in Global Economic Prospects, 
129-150 (Washington, D.C., 2001).
29
 Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Intellectual Property Rights:  Implications for 
Development (Aug. 2003).
30 WTO Agreements & Public Health:  A Joint Study by the WHO and the WTO Secretariat (2002).
31
 PhRMA [the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America] is the trade association for major 
proprietary drug companies in the U.S.  The international pharmaceutical lobby group is called the 
International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.  When referring to PhRMA, this 
paper is not just referring to the formal trade association but to the international cartel of patent holders that 
have pursued mutually advantageous intellectual property strategies often in collaboration with U.S. and 
European trade negotiators.  
32
Efforts by the Thai government in 1999-2000 to produce the drug under the compulsory licensing 
provision of TRIPS, as demanded by Thai NGOs and PLWHAs, failed as the United States 
government brought intense pressure and made a threat of Special 301 sanctions on Thai exports 
through its trade arm, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), in clear violation of its obligations 
under the WTO.
In fact, GPO's attempt at procuring raw materials in December 1999 for DDI from a Japanese 
company (which is also the main supplier to BMS) also failed because of pressure from BMS. 
Therefore GPO had to turn to Canadian suppliers who charged twice the price. The BMS case in 
Thailand is a classic example of the overriding profiteering motives of drug multinationals over 
access to essential medicines for public health, how companies use patents with minor 
modifications to establish monopolies and extend the period of patent protection, the bullying 
trade tactics of the U.S. government and its attempts to preserve the monopoly of its transnational 
drug companies.
R. Ramachandran, A patent war in Thailand <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-
October/005515.html> (Oct. 15, 2003). 
33 See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 
112 Stat. 2681 (1999):
[N]one of the funds appropriated under this heading may be available for assistance for the central 
Government of the Republic of South Africa, until the Secretary of State reports in writing to the 
appropriate committees of the Congress on the steps being taken by the United State Government 
to work with the Government of the Republic of South Africa to negotiate the repeal, suspension, 
or termination of section 15(c) of South Africa’s Medicines and Related Substances Control 
Amendment Act No. 90 of 1997.
According to U.S. State Department documents and statements at the time, “[multiple federal agencies] 
have been engaged in an assiduous, concerted campaign to persuade the Government of South Africa to 
modify the provisions of Article 15(C)” that the U.S. believed violated the TRIPS Agreement.  Patricia D. 
Siplon, AIDS and the Policy Struggle in the United States, 120-21 (Georgetown Press, Washington D.C., 
2002).  For a discussion of early pro-pharma U.S. trade policy in South Africa, see Patrick Bond, 
Globalization, Pharmaceutical Pricing and South African Health Policy:  Managing Confrontation with 
U.S. Firms and Politicians, 29 Int’l J. Health  Services 768 (1999).  
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sanctions because they refused to grant greater TRIPS-plus rights to patent holders and/or 
because they proposed using TRIPS compliant means to access more affordable medicines.  At 
the same time that the U.S. was engaged in “a full court press” against South Africa,35 thirty-nine 
pharmaceutical plaintiffs sued the Mandela government challenging new legislation designed to 
permit parallel importation of medicines a patent holder had sold more cheaply in another 
country, generic substitution in filling prescriptions of off-patent medicines, and greater price 
transparency.36  Fortunately, the trade threats against South Africa, the now infamous 
pharmaceutical lawsuit, and the WTO complaint against Brazil were all defeated between 1999-
2001 by a Southern/Northern alliance that engaged in a coordinated public campaign against 
U.S./PhRMA policy.  As a result of this intense pressure, the Clinton administration eventually 
reverse some of its more draconian trade threats and promised to pursue a slightly more benign 
trade policy in sub-Saharan Africa.37
2.2  – The Doha Declaration
As the pandemic intensified and as treatment activists worldwide demanded a relaxation of the 
stranglehold patent holders held over life-saving medicines, developing countries collaborated to 
demand that public health be given a more meaningful role in the interpretation and 
implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.38  Thus, in April of 2001, Zimbabwe, on behalf of the 
Africa Group, demanded that the TRIPS Council convene a special session on access to 
medicines.  The resulting June 2001 meeting provoked stark positioning by the U.S.39 and E.U.,40
who jointly advanced pro-PhRMA positions, but it also resulted in a strong platform by 
developing countries that evolved with later submissions to include the following points:  (1) 
developing countries have a broad spectrum of public health concerns, not just HIV/AIDS, and 
they are particularly concerned about the lack of research on so-called neglected diseases; (2) 
patents raise prices and thus impede access to medicines; (3) developing countries should be free 
to use existing TRIPS flexibilities including compulsory licenses and parallel importation without 
being threatened by developed countries; (4) least developed members needed an extension of 
transitional periods beyond 2006; (5) developing countries needed to be able to source generic 
34
 For a brief history of the U.S. WTO complaint against Brazil, see Ellen t’Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical 
Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines:  A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 Chi. J. Int’l Law 27, 30-
33 (2002).
35
 Siplon, supra note 33, at 121.
36 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 
Case No. 4193/98 (filed Feb. 18, 1998).  The lawsuit was unconditionally dismissed in April 2001 
following “strong international public outrage.”  t’Hoen, supra note 35, at 31.
37
 Siplon, supra note 33, at 123-26. Of particular note, is the Clinton Executive Order of May 10, 2000, 
Executive Order 13155, 3 C.F.R. 268 (2000), which in relevant part, reads:
(a ) In administering sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United States shall not seek, 
through negotiation or otherwise, the revocation or revision of any intellectual property law or 
policy of a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country, as determined by the President, that regulates 
HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies if the law or policy of the country: (1) 
promotes access to HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals or medical technologies for affected populations in 
that country; and (2) provides adequate and effective intellectual property protection consistent 
with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) 
referred to in section 101(d)(15) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(15)).
38 For a detailed account of this collaboration, see Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health:  Lighting the Dark Corner at the WTO, 5(2) J. Int’l Econ. Law 469, 
480-90 (2002).  Developing countries rejected the theory that differential pricing would meet their needs.
39
 U.S. Statement at TRIPS Council Meeting, June 20, 2001,<http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/pharm-
policy/2001-June/001175.html>. 
40
 Communication from the European Communities and their member states, IP/C/W/280 (June 12, 2001).
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medicines from exporting countries despite the “predominately for domestic use” rule in Article 
31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, preferably through an Article 30 limited exception; and (6) 
developing countries needed assurances that data protection rules in Article 39.3 would not 
impede registration of generics.41
Although the U.S. continued to discount the importance of patent protection on either price or 
access to treatment,42 to insist on limiting discussion to “emergencies” like HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
and tuberculosis, and to advocate for restricting parallel importation,43 the negotiations took a 
sharp turn in the wake of the anthrax scare in the U.S. post September 11.  Based on a handful of 
deaths and some anthrax-laden letters delivered to government offices, officials in both the U.S. 
and Canada threatened Bayer, the patent owner of the ciprofloxacin, a preferred anthrax 
treatment, with compulsory licenses if Bayer could not supply needed quantities of cipro at low 
cost and in high volumes.  Suddenly, the urgency of public health concerns became palpable to 
U.S. decision-makers.  In response, the resolve of the developing world stiffened and prospects 
for a pro-public health TRIPS accord soared.   
Accordingly, on November 14, 2001, WTO members unanimously approved the Doha 
Declaration.  Designed by developing countries to counteract continuing trade threats and a crisis 
in medical care, the Doha Declaration emphasized the primacy of public health and the right of 
Member Nations to take measures designed to increase access to affordable medicines.  In 
relevant part, the Doha Declaration states: 
1. We recognize the gravity of public health problems afflicting many developing and 
least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics.
2. We stress the need for the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) to be part of the wider national and international 
action to address these problems.
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development of 
new medicines.  We also recognize the concerns about its effects on prices.
4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking measures to protect public health.  Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should 
41
 See Developing Country Group’s Paper, IP/C/W/296 (June 20, 2001); Draft Ministerial Declaration –
Proposal from a Group of Developing Countries, IP/C/W/312 (October 4, 2001).
42
 In making this argument, the U.S. relied heavily on an unpublished study subsequently published in the 
fall of 2001.  Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access 
to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886, 1888 (Oct. 17, 2001).  Although HIV medicines have not 
been patented pervasively throughout the developing world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
explanation for this pattern of non-uniform patenting is that smaller and poorer nations do not have markets 
that warrant the cost of patent applications.  Despite incomplete patenting, however, there are multiple 
antiretroviral patents in those few countries, South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria, that have meaningful 
market size and some pharmaceutical capacity.  Similarly, there is a pattern whereby some of the most 
important low-dose, low-cost anti-viral medicines are patented in countries where the disease is 
concentrated. Low-cost, front-line antiretroviral therapies involving 3TC, d4T, AZT, Abacavir, and/or 
Nevirapine are significantly blocked by patents in countries containing 68% of HIV positive persons in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Consumer Project on Technology et als., Comment on Attaran/Gillespie-White and 
PhRMA Surveys of Patents on Antiretroviral drugs in Africa (Oct. 16, 2001).
43
 Preambular language for a ministerial declaration, contribution from Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Switzerland, and the United States, IP/C/W/313 (October 4, 2001); Non-Paper, Contribution from Canada, 
the Czeck Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United States <http://lists.essential.org/
pipermail/ip-health/2001-September/001891.html> (September 19, 2001). 
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be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to 
protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
5. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, 
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in light of the object 
and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives 
and principles.
(b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted... .
(c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood 
that public health crises, including those relation to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other 
circumstance of extreme urgency. 
(d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to 
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the 
MFN [Most Favored Nation] and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 
and 4.
In addition to clarifying the preeminence of public health and the importance of access to 
medicines and confirming key flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration 
also promised to resolve the so-called production-for-export problem:
6. We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in 
the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of 
compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.  We instruct the Council for 
TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General 
Council before the end of 2002.
Via paragraph 6, all WTO members recognized that countries with insufficient or inefficient 
manufacturing capacity would not be able meet their needs for cheaper pharmaceutical products 
by internal production even when they override patents through the issuance of compulsory 
licenses.  Key transitional time periods in the TRIPS agreement would soon require worldwide 
protection for pharmaceutical products beginning in 2005 even for countries like India that had 
previously given patent protection only to pharmaceutical processes.44  This change in India’s 
patent law would dramatically curtail its current lawful practice of reverse-engineering drugs and 
then producing them for export.  Instead, post-1995 generics produced in any WTO member 
country (except hypothetically in least developed countries) would ordinarily have to be produced 
pursuant to compulsory licenses.45  As previously discussed, Article 31(f) of TRIPS limits 
44
 Article 65.4.  There is now an even longer transitional period for least developed countries (increased 
from 2006 to 2016), but the short-term prospect that any of them will become large-scale manufacturers 
and exporters of pharmaceuticals seems remote.  See Article 66 of TRIPS and Paragraph 7 of the Doha 
Declaration. 
45
 The problem does not arise simply with respect to medicines newly patented in 2005 or thereafter.  
TRIPS already has a “mail-box” rule whereby developing countries are obligated to establish mechanisms 
for receiving, processing, and establishing “priority-in-time” for pharmaceutical patent applications.  
Furthermore, developing countries have to grant exclusive distribution rights to the patent applicant when 
certain prescribed conditions were satisfied.  Article 70.  Thus, the mailbox rule effectively precludes 
generic manufacturers in developing countries that do not recognize patents on medicines or product 
patents from producing “copies” of medicines described in pending “mailbox” applications.  Stated 
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production under a compulsory license “predominantly” to the domestic market.  This then was 
the essence of the production-for-export dilemma – desperate demand but no certain source of 
future supply.  
The terms of a fair and expeditious solution were repeatedly advanced by the Africa Group and 
an affiliated coalition of developing countries46 and NGOs47.  According to this pro-public health 
coalition, the production-for-export accord should cover a broad range of diseases and public 
health needs, so that medicines for multiple debilitating and deadly conditions could be accessed 
more cheaply.  Countries should be able to import a broad range of medical products including 
medicines, vaccines, diagnostic tests, and other medical products.  Likewise, any country should 
be able to make use of the Declaration’s public health provisions, even though it is undoubtedly 
true that developing countries had the greatest need.  To supply importing countries, any country 
should be eligible to be an exporter, though there is an underlying need to fulfill the promise of 
technology transfer.  In addition, onerous diversion rules should not be imposed to address the 
illusory risk of re-export and sale in rich countries like the U.S. and Europe that are perfectly 
capable of reducing or eliminating product diversion on their own.  And finally, procedural 
requirements should be minimized, meaning that a limited exception under Article 30 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, as endorsed by the WHO48 and many other countries49 was vastly superior to 
the proposed U.S. solution requiring hundreds of product-by-product, country-by-country 
compulsory licenses in exporting countries.  A solution with these terms, articulating definite and 
differently, patent applicants have significant and exclusive market advantages with respect to post-1995 
discoveries even before the full adoption of TRIPS in developing countries.
46 See, Statement on the Considerations for Paragraph 6 Modalities Delivered by Kenya on Behalf of the 
African Group, Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Thailand at the TRIPS Council Meeting on March 5, 2002, IP/C/M/35 (March 22, 
2002); Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, IP/C/351 (June 24, 2002); 
Communication from Brazil on behalf of Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela IP/C/W/355 (June 24, 2002); South 
African Non-Paper on Substantive and Procedural Elements of a Report to the General Council under 
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Job(02)/156 (November 5, 
2002); Communication from Kenya, the Coordinator of the African Group, IPC/W/389 (November 14, 
2002).  
47
 A partial list of international NGO’s active in the campaign for access to treatment and for simplified 
Article 30 procedures includes:  Oxfam International; Action Aids Alliance; Consumer Project on 
Technology US; Health Global Access Project (GAP); Health Action International; Lawyers Collective' 
HIV/AIDS Unit, India; Medecins sans Frontieres; Thai NGO Coalition on AIDS and Thai Network of 
People with HIV/AIDS; Third World Network; and Treatment Action Campaign, South Africa.
48
 This is the solution expressly endorsed on September 17, 2002, by the World Health Organization:  
[T]he limited exception under Article 30 is the most consistent with this public health principle.  
This solution will give WTO Members expeditious authorization, as requested by the Doha 
Declaration, to permit third parties to make, sell and export medicines and other health 
technologies to address public health needs.  
It is also the solution implicitly endorsed by the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights which 
emphasized the importance of economies-of-scale in attracting generic producers. And, finally, it is the 
solution temporarily endorsed by the European Parliament to amend its medicines regulation scheme:  
Manufacturing shall be allowed if the medicinal product is intended for export to a third country 
that has issued a compulsory license for that product, or where a patent is not in force and if there 
is a request to that effect of the competent public health authorities of that third country.
Amendment 196 to the DIRECTIVE 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament (since rejected).
49
 Developing countries championed an explicit Article 30 solution right up until the fall of 2002, though it 
is notable that the South African Non-Paper of November 5, supra note 47, and the Communication from 
Kenya, the Coordinator of the African Group, supra note 47, both fail to mention Article 30 directly.  
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enduring rights, would have been a huge step in addressing the crisis of access to affordable 
medicines in the developing world.
2.3  Impasse 
Nonetheless, after initially agreeing in the Doha Declaration, the U.S, for nearly two years, 
blocked meaningful efforts to liberalize access to generics and in particular blocked an 
expeditious and efficient solution to the production-for-export dilemma.50  The extent of the U.S. 
blocking strategy was epitomized in its first two Paragraph 6 submissions to the TRIPS Council,51
which proposed the following conditionalities: 
(1) a requirement that export licenses be limited to addressing "grave" or "urgent" public 
health emergencies, such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria only (a restriction 
previously defeated in the Doha Declaration);
(2) limits on the types of public health products to be covered by the agreement to 
pharmaceutical products only;
(3) limits on the sectors which might be supplied by the agreement, specifically 
excluding the private or “commercial, for-profit sector;”
(4)  limits on the importing countries that might benefit from the agreement:
(a) no application to small market countries that theoretically have technical 
capacity to produce medicines but insufficient market size to achieve 
economies-of-scale,
(b) strict application of the "insufficient manufacturing capacity" standard to 
exclude countries where production was theoretically possible but otherwise 
infeasible or impractical,
(c) income limits that would exclude many developing countries, especially 
middle-tier countries;
(5)  limits on the countries that might export (developing countries only);
(6)  a preference for Article 31(f) compulsory licensing solutions in the exporting  
      state that create multiple barriers to implementation including:
(a) prior negotiation on commercially reasonable terms with the patent holder 
who might impose onerous conditionalities,
(b) costly, burdensome, and protracted individual determinations in 
administrative or judicial proceedings to grant each license on a case-by-case 
basis,
(c) dependency on the willingness of a third country to go through such 
burdensome procedures because of a public health need in a third country,
(d) proof both of a triggering public health need in the affected country and of 
technical incapacity to produce a particular medicine,
(e) determination of the level of license compensation in the producing country 
rather than in the importing country and imposition of a licensing fee even 
with respect to imports into a no-patent country;
(7) strict anti-diversion guarantees and limitations on re-export, especially to developed 
countries, but perhaps even regionally between developing countries with 
comparable public health needs.
50
 These measures include parallel importation, relaxation of the predominately for domestic use rule in 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, and use of the limited exception option in Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
51
 Communication from the United States, IP/C/W/340 (March 14, 2002); Second Communication from the 
United States, IP/C/W/358 (July 9, 2002).
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According to developing world critics and their allies, each of these conditions violated the letter 
and spirit of the Doha Declaration and each risked undermining expeditious and efficient 
responses to public health needs. Although the U.S. eventually retreated on three conditions,52 it 
succeeded in inserting most of them in a “compromise” text agreement prepared by Ambassador 
Motta, Chairman of the TRIPS Council.53  However, because it could not impose further 
agreement with respect to its restrictive view on covered disease,54 the U.S. unilaterally rejected 
the Motta compromise on December 20, 2002,55 ensuring that a Paragraph 6 solution would not 
be realized by the end of 2002 as promised.
As expected, developing countries were deeply offended by the U.S. attack on their sovereignty 
and by its suggestions that only a few diseases should be covered by the paragraph 6 solution.  
Even though rich countries with ample productive capacity would be able to issue compulsory 
licenses on any grounds whatsoever pursuant to the baseline flexibilities of Article 31, poorer and 
smaller countries would have options to address a short list of pandemic diseases and a baker’s 
dozen of tropical diseases for which there were few if any medicines.56   Suddenly, the scales of 
compulsory licensing were tilted in favor of the U.S. and Europe, which can produce on-patent 
medicines domestically should they so decide, and against countries like Malawi that have to rely 
on imports.  These disfavored countries would, according to Northern demands, have to favor 
AIDS patients over people with diabetes, or people with malaria over people with asthma.  This 
imbalance seemed to violate the promise that Doha was a pro-development round and further 
violated one of the bedrock principles of the WTO free trade system and the TRIPS Agreement, 
52
 The U.S. first relaxed its insistence on market segmentation, which theretofore had excluded the for-
profit sector.  Second, it dropped its insistence on production by developing countries only, but only after 
this strategy had driven a partial wedge into the developing country coalition, essentially raising questions 
among some Africa countries whether India and Brazil were pursuing an industrial policy option that would 
undermine the development of pharmaceutical capacity in Africa.   Finally, it agreed to allow more 
efficient regional trade of generics in WTO-sanctioned regional trading groups, so long as the groups 
contained at least 50% least developed countries.
53
 Draft Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, JOB(02)/217 <http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/wto12162002.html> (December 16, 2002). 
54
 The U.S. position on the scope of disease issue was that the Paragraph 6 solution should only cover 
“grave public health crises associated with HIV/AIDS, malaria, or tuberculosis and other infectious 
epidemics of comparable scale and gravity.”  
55
 Ambassador Eduardo Pérez Motta of Mexico who chaired the TRIPS Council told the General Council 
of the WTO on December 20, 2002, that intensive consultations had not resolved differences over the 
diseases that would be covered by the draft decision on intellectual property and health.  WTO Press 
Release <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr329_e.htm> (December 20, 2002). 
56 Europe and Japan backed the U.S. attempt to dramatically limit the scope of diseases by jointly 
proposing a list of tropical diseases most of which had no effective treatment whatsoever or which had no 
viable medical treatment still under patent.  "This decision applies to public health problems arising from 
yellow fever, plague, cholera, meningococcal disease, African trypanosomiasis, dengue, influenza, 
HIV/AIDS, leishmaniasis, TB, malaria, hepatitis, leptospirosis, pertussis, poliomyelitis, schistosomiasis, 
typhoid fever, typhus, measles, shigellosis, haemorrhagic fevers, and arbovirues and other epidemics of 
comparable gravity and scale including those that might arise in the future whether due to natural 
occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use.”  PhRMA/US/Korea/EC/Mexico proposed footnote 
(December 20, 2002) <http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/listofdiseases12202002.html>.  When Europe 
asked the WHO to broker the list of diseases, (“When requested by a Member, the World Health 
Organization shall give its advice as to the occurrence in an importing Member, or the likelihood thereof, of 
any other public health problem,” EU Draft Proposal for a Compromise Solution (January 7, 2003)), the 
WHO politely but firmly declined, (interview with German Velasquez   <http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/
velasquez01102003.html> (January 10, 2003)), sending the negotiators back to the drawing board.  
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namely that the trading system should not preferentially advantage domestic producers over 
importing producers.
3.  COVERAGE OF THE AUGUST 30 PARAGRAPH 6 IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT 
AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PRE-EXISTING AND CONTINUING FLEXIBILITIES IN 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE DOHA DECLARATION 
Although the U.S. and PhRMA continued efforts to  influence developing countries to accede to 
disease restrictions, the pro-public health coalition held firm.  In the face of developing country 
solidarity, the U.S. and PhRMA eventually relented, but only after insisting that the Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement be supplemented by the General Council Chairperson’s “clarifying” 
Statement.57  The exact legal effect of the Chairperson’s Statement is uncertain, but it is directly 
referenced in the underlying Agreement.58  Of course, rather than merely clarifying, the 
Chairperson’s Statement wrapped the Paragraph 6 solution with an even tighter tangle of red tape. 
Nonetheless, developing countries must strive to unravel this tangle in order to access cheaper 
generic medicines most efficiently.  
3.1.  Limited Flexibilities in the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and 
Chairperson’s Statement
Although there are many remaining flexibilities for importing generic medicines,59 neither singly 
nor collectively do they go far enough to ensure an energetic market in developing countries for 
generic medicines essential to combat AIDS and other public health problems.  In essence, and 
with the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the U.S. has engaged in a future-oriented, two-part 
squeeze play designed to downsize the impact of the Doha Declaration.  To counteract this, 
developing countries must argue for the broadest possible interpretations of the Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement and to resist all efforts to implement it narrowly.60
3.1.1 Pharmaceutical products and diseases covered
1.  For the purposes of this Decision: (a) "pharmaceutical product" means any patented product, 
or product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to 
address the public health problems as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration. It is 
understood that active ingredients necessary for its manufacture and diagnostic kits needed for 
its use would be included.
Developing countries did not obtain the desired clarification that the term “pharmaceutical 
products” covered vaccines and microbicides, but the definition was expanded to cover 
“diagnostic kits” needed for the use of another pharmaceutical product.  Thus, important blood 
test technologies are covered.  Likewise, including coverage of “active ingredients necessary for 
57 See JOB(03)/177 < http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm> (August 
28, 2003). 
58
 “This Decision was adopted by the General Council in light of a statement read out by the Chairman 
which can be found in JOB(03/177).”  At the very least, developed countries will argue that the 
Chairperson’s Statement represents some interpretive guidance with respect to the intention of Member 
States in adopting the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.
59 See subsection 3.2, infra.
60
 One of the first instances of possible narrowing of the scope of Paragraph 6 implementation was 
statements by the Canadian government that it was considering disease limitations in its proposed 
amendments to its Patent Act.  A concentrated campaign led by Canadian NGOs has defeated that threat.
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the manufacture” of a pharmaceutical product is important in order to access essential active 
pharmaceutical ingredients where those ingredients are separately patented.
Developing countries fought hard in the Doha Declaration for the broadest possible disease 
coverage by the naming of the Declaration, by the unrestricted reference to protecting public 
health in Paragraph 4,61 and by the interpretive principles of Paragraph 5(a) which “requires that 
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in light of the object and purposes of the 
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.”62  Nonetheless, the 
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement makes reference to “public health problems as 
recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration” rather than to paragraph 4 in referencing diseases 
covered by the Agreement.  However, given the tortured nine months of negotiations described in 
Section 2.3. above, whereby developing countries firmly resisted any efforts to codify disease 
limitations, the only felicitous interpretation of the phrase “public health problems as recognized 
in paragraph 1 of the Declaration” is that it covers the broadest range of public health problems 
not merely the listed “grave” or pandemic problems.
3.1.2 “Eligible Importing Members”
1(b)  "eligible importing Member" means any least-developed country Member, and any other 
Member that has made a notification2 to the Council for TRIPS of its intention to use the system 
as an importer, it being understood that a Member may notify at any time that it will use the 
system, in whole or in a limited way, for example only in the case of a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. It is noted that 
some Members will not use the system set out in this Decision as importing Members3 and that 
some other Members have stated that, if they use the system, it would be in no more than 
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
2 It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the 
system set out in this Decision.
3 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States of America.
In controlling importing country eligibility, the U.S. and other developed countries succeeded in 
imposing four limits on the number of countries that are permitted to import generic medicines 
pursuant to a compulsory license to address a public health need.  First, the U.S./E.U. brokered an 
absolute agreement from twenty-three relatively rich countries that they would not issue 
compulsory licenses for importation under any circumstances.  Obviously, many of these 
countries are large enough and have sufficiently capable generic industries to issue a compulsory 
license for domestic production.  But still the U.S. has succeeded in shrinking the richest part of 
the international market, essentially engaging in protectionism at a historic level.  
61
 “We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health.  …[W]e affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in 
a manner to supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all.”  (Emphasis added.)  Paragraph 4 makes no reference to grave public health 
problems recognized in Paragraph 1, nor does it even make reference to the non-restrictive list of diseases, 
“HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics,” listed in Paragraph 1.
62 Those objectives and principles in TRIPS specifically include Article 8.1 under which “Members may, in 
formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health… .”  
[Emphasis added.]  
19
Second, the U.S./E.U. convinced some other, generally smaller or slightly poorer countries 
(twelve in all) to agree to issue compulsory licenses for import only in order to address national 
emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency.63  Accordingly, another piece of the 
potential market for generic medicines was lopped off, including some countries that have no 
domestic capacity whatsoever.  Third, the U.S./E.U., forced ten E.U. accession countries to 
import only on an emergency or urgency basis and to relinquish even this right when they joined 
the E.U.64  This will certainly have a devastating impact on the costs of medicines in some very 
poor Eastern European countries, including some that are facing an escalating HIV/AIDS crisis.  
The fourth limitation on the eligibility of importing countries is more subtle and arises with 
respect to a developing country’s right to determine that it lacks sufficient domestic 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector.  Here requirements of proof, opportunities 
for behind-the-scenes pressure, and the possibility of review, impact the potential willingness of 
developing countries to make use of Paragraph 6 production-for-export mechanisms.
Implementation Agreement Provision
1. The obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement shall 
be waived with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory license to the extent necessary for 
the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an eligible 
importing Member(s) in accordance with the terms set out below in this paragraph: 
a. the eligible importing Member(s)4 has made a notification2  to the Council for TRIPS, that 
ii. confirms that the eligible importing Member in question, other than a least-developed 
country Member, has established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question in one of the 
ways set out in the Annex to this decision; (emphasis added) 
4
  Joint notification providing the information required under this subparagraph may be made by the 
regional organization referred to in paragraph 6 of this Decision on Behalf of eligible importing Members 
using the system that are parties to them, with the agreement of those parties.
2   It is understood that this notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the 
system set out in this Decision.
ANNEX TO DECISION
Assessment of Manufacturing Capacities in the Pharmaceutical Sector
Least-developed country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
     For other eligible importing Members insufficient or no manufacturing capacities for the product(s) in 
question may be established in either of the following ways (emphasis added):
i. the Member in question has established that it has no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector; or 
ii. where the Member has some manufacturing capacity in this sector, it has examined this capacity 
and found that, excluding any capacity owned or controlled by the patent owner, it is currently 
insufficient for the purposes of meeting its needs. When it is established that such capacity has 
become sufficient to meet the Member's needs, the system shall no longer apply. [Emphasis 
added.]
63
 Hong Kong China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates.  Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 58. 
64
 Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia.  Id.
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Pursuant to this provision, least developing countries are automatically eligible importers, 
regardless of actual capacity.  However, other developing countries are eligible only if they have 
no capacity or insufficient current capacity based on an unspecified form of self-examination.  
Moreover, they are required to monitor their domestic capacity over time such that when the 
capacity becomes sufficient, “the system shall no longer apply.”  Despite the imprecision of the 
“insufficient capacity” requirement, developing countries were originally pleased that prior 
notification did not equate prior “approval by a WTO body” and thus that countries’ sovereign 
decision-making processes were to be honored. Unfortunately, the Chairperson’s Statement 
undermines that reprieve and provides for ad hoc review of determinations of insufficient 
capacity that might deter some countries from using the Paragraph 6 solution.
Chairperson’s Statement
Third, it is important that Members seek to resolve any issues arising from the use and 
implementation of the Decision expeditiously and amicably:
• To promote transparency and avoid controversy, notifications under paragraph 
2(a)(ii) of the Decision would include information on how the Member in question had 
established, in accordance with the Annex, that it has insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.
• In accordance with the normal practice of the TRIPS Council, notifications made 
under the system shall be brought to the attention of its next meeting.
• Any Member may bring any matter related to the interpretation or implementation of 
the Decision, including issues related to diversion, to the TRIPS Council for 
expeditious review, with a view to taking appropriate action.
• If any Member has concerns that the terms of the Decision have not been fully 
complied with, the Member may also utilise the good offices of the Director General 
or Chair of the TRIPS Council, with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution.
Fourth, all information gathered on the implementation of the Decision shall be brought to the 
attention of the TRIPS Council in its annual review as set out in paragraph 8 of the Decision. 
[Emphasis added.]
With the Chairperson’s Statement, the U.S. succeeded in imposing a fourth eligibility barrier that 
threatens importation for many middle-income developing countries.  Basically, the U.S. has set 
up an ad hoc notification-and-review process whereby countries needing to import generics 
because of incapacity in their pharmaceutical sector will be forced to prove and then defend such 
determinations.  The standard for proving "insufficient capacity" is terribly uncertain.  The U.S., 
in its negotiation positions, has treated insufficient capacity as a technical term addressing 
theoretical physical plant capacity no matter how inefficient or impracticable local production 
would be.  Similarly, the U.S. does not acknowledge that an industry may be technologically 
capable but unable in the short run to produce a needed medicine or that an industry may be 
unwilling to apply for a compulsory license because of an overly restricted local market.  
Developing countries and treatment activists, on the other hand, have consistently argued that 
“insufficient” capacity must be analyzed in pragmatic economic terms to cover situations where 
local production would be economically inefficient, oftentimes because of inability to reach 
meaningful economies-of-scale.  Access activists essentially argue for an expansive definition of 
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incapacity to mean an inability to produce the medicines quickly, efficiently, and sustainability on 
terms equal to or better than generic medicines sourced on the international market.65
Although developing countries have a strong basis to argue that their determinations of 
insufficient capacity should be given presumptive weight and that their obligations to justify their 
decisions require only minimum evidence and rationality, the reporting-and-review process could 
well deter some countries from risking involvement in a damaging and costly WTO dispute 
resolution process.  This prove-it-and-review-it standard does not name countries, but it could 
have a deterrent effect on middle-income developing countries with some capacity that might 
otherwise choose to import cheaper generics.  To counteract this forced self-exclusion from the 
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, developing countries will need to be aggressive in 
making their incapacity determinations and in resisting after-the-fact micromanagement from the 
U.S. or other Member states. 
3.1.3    Eligible importing “regions”
One of developing countries’ victories in the Paragraph 6 negotiations was a provision allowing 
developing countries to notify the WTO of their collective decision to import medicines and more 
importantly the right of a regional trade group to trade generic medicines whether medicines were 
first produced domestically or imported from a non-regional trade member. 
6. With a view to harnessing economies-of-scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing 
power for, and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products:
i. where a developing or least-developed country WTO Member is a party to a regional 
trade agreement within the meaning of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Decision 
of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and 
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (L/4903), at least half of the current 
membership of which is made up countries presently on the United Nations list of least-
developed countries, the obligation of that Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be waived to the extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product 
produced or imported under a compulsory license in that Member to be exported to the 
markets of those other developing or least-developed country parties to the regional 
trade agreement that share the health problem in question. It is understood that this will 
not prejudice the territorial nature of the patent rights in question;
65
 The current threat by Brazil to import three generic ARVs from India (efavirenz, lopinavir, and 
nelfinavir) is a perfect example of how this fight might play out in the future.  Brazil May Break Patents on 
Merck & Co., Roche, and Abbot Lab AIDS Drugs <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-
August/005132.html> (August 21, 2003).  It is important to remember, however, that the current Brazil 
threat to import is not subject to Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement because it involves generics that 
India can still legally produce.  If the Agreement did apply, the U.S. would certainly argue that Brazil has 
capacity to manufacture generic ARVs – it has done so in the past and it has already reverse-engineered the 
new ARVs.  However, Brazil would counter that it cannot make the new generics quickly and perhaps that 
it cannot do so efficiently compared to the lower cost of imported Indian generics.
The U.S. insisted on a forum for making these kinds of objections and for having the TRIPS Council 
and even the WTO General Council "review" the operation of the production for export solution.  One can 
imagine the U.S. complaining that the solution is being abused and that too many countries are seeking 
import licenses.  Developing countries tried to limit this review and argued that the required documentation 
of incapacity need be skeletal at best, but now they and generic producers must worry about after-the-fact 
challenges to import licenses.  Once again, one can imagine the reluctance of a generic producer to invest 
in productive, export capacity and to begin to make medicines only the have the import license pulled 
because of U.S./TRIPS Council review or because of behind-the-scenes U.S. bullying.
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An acknowledged rationale for permitting regional procurement and regional trade in generic 
medicines was to “harness economies-of-scale.”  Accordingly, this provision recognizes the value 
of collaboration to enhance purchasing power and the importance of expanded markets to 
incentivize local production.  Obviously, this provision will be important in the African context 
where regional trading groups could easily involve more than 50% least developing countries.  
 it is recognized that the development of systems providing for the grant of regional patents to be 
applicable in the above Members should be promoted. To this end, developed country Members 
undertake to provide technical cooperation in accordance with Article 67 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, including in conjunction with other relevant intergovernmental organizations. 
One of the unfortunate trade-offs in this regional trade provision, however, is developing 
countries’ agreement that a regional patent system is desirable.  Of course, there are already two 
regional patent agreements in Africa.66  Moreover, it is important for developing countries to try 
to conserve their administrative resources and to avoid overly duplicative structures between 
similarly situated members.  However, it is by no means certain that harmonization of patent 
standards will inure to the long-term benefit of developing countries despite the efforts of the 
World Intellectual Property Organization to achieve the same.67  This is particularly true since the 
“technical assistance” provided by developed countries is so often patent-enhancing.  The details 
of patent harmonization, even on an expanded regional basis, should be approached with great 
caution.
3.1.4.  “Eligible exporting Members” and “technology transfer”
     1.(c)   "exporting Member" means a Member using the system set out in this Decision to   
               produce pharmaceutical products for, and export them to, an eligible importing Member.
The definition of exporting Member is broad enough to include any WTO member.  This 
represents a partial victory for developing countries which did not want to be limited to an 
unnecessarily restricted list of potential suppliers.  Pursuant to this new-found authority, both 
Canada and the European Commission are pursuing legislation authorizing production-for-export.  
On the other hand, developing countries had also argued vigorously for enhancements in local 
capacity to produce medicines and thus had argued for technology transfers and other assistance 
to help development of that capacity.  Gains in this area were meager and contradictory.
2. Members recognize the desirability of promoting the transfer of technology and capacity 
building in the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the problem identified in 
paragraph 6 of the Declaration. To this end, eligible importing Members and exporting 
Members are encouraged to use the system set out in this Decision in a way which would 
promote this objective. Members undertake to cooperate in paying special attention to the 
transfer of technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in the work to 
be undertaken pursuant to Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, paragraph 7 of the 
Declaration and any other relevant work of the Council for TRIPS.
66
 Organisation Africaine de la Propriete Intellectuelle (16 members) and African Regional Industrial 
Property Association (15 members).
67 See, e.g., WIPO Working Group on Reform of the Patent Cooperation Treaty, Options for Future 
Development of International Search and Examination:  Making Greater Use of International Reports, 
PCT/R/WG/5/9 (Sept. 19, 2003).
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Undoubtedly technology transfer is an important issue for developing countries and it had 
received little real commitment from developed countries.  Indeed most evidence post-TRIPS is 
that manufacturing capacity in developing countries has been reduced as major producers shut 
down smaller in-country “finishing factories” that were established to satisfy pre-TRIPS local-
working requirements.  However, the focus on technology transfer is a double-edged sword.  
Local production within a country or region can fulfill employment, industrial-policy, and 
development goals; it can synergistically build technical capacity re manufacturing processes; it 
can ease procurement and distribution problems, contribute to the local tax base, and decrease 
demand for foreign currency reserves and import financing, though in most instances active 
ingredients and expertise will still be imported.  On the other hand, there may be inefficiencies in 
local production and therefore real cost disadvantages.  Moreover, developing countries should be 
cautious about over-investment or over-reliance on local production options, especially since so 
many countries are hoping to become regional suppliers in Africa.  Exactly how many generic 
drug companies in Africa can become cost-effective and price-competitive producers for the 
region?68  The Clinton Foundation’s ARV agreement with Aspen Pharmacare of South Africa 
suggests that some African generics can compete with Cipla, Ranbaxy, and Matrix, three Indian 
producers, but should each African country be wooed into imagining itself as a significant player 
in the regional market for essential generic medicines?  
Answering this question depends in part on the economics of viable generic manufacturing 
(discussed in sub-section 5, infra), but developing countries should also be leery of whether the 
U.S. and other developed countries will use developing countries’ early attempts to establish 
generic capacity against them.  Since the previous discussion of the Paragraph 6 Implementation 
Agreement already highlighted the fact that the U.S. has a very narrow technical interpretation of 
productive capacity, developing countries might soon see themselves shut out, or at least 
challenged, should they try to switch options and seek imports of other on-patent generic 
medicines from abroad under the Paragraph 6 accord.  In other words, inefficient and thus 
unsustainable local capacity might haunt developing countries’ subsequent resort to alternative, 
superior sourcing options.
3.1.5   Non-commercial motivation
Members recognize that the system that will be established by the Decision should be used in 
good faith to protect public health and, without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the Decision, not be an 
instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives.69
Questions have been raised whether the Chairperson’s Statement directly restricts generic 
exporters’ right to make a profit or whether it has alternative meanings.70  In particular, 
commentators are concerned whether an exporting nation like India will be permitted to support 
the export market by making ready use of the Paragraph 6 Agreement to issue compulsory 
licenses for export.    The U.S. and pharmaceutical interests originally argued (as late as August 
68
 So far Cosmos Pharmaceuticals Ltd. of Kenya, Aspen Pharmacare of South Africa, Kimia Farma of 
Indonesia, Brazilian supported companies in Genin Republic, Ghana, and Nigeria, a Cuban supported firm 
in Namibia, Shanghai Desano Biopharmaceutical of China, two unidentified companies in Ethiopia, and 
perhaps others have announced intentions to manufacture generic medicines.
69
 Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 58.
70
 Reports in the press have argued that the text is designed to limit drug use in the importing country to 
public, non-commercial use (Wall St. Journal 8/28/03), that it applies to both locally produced generics and 
imported ones (Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report 8/28/03), and that developing countries should not take 
measure to promote a domestic pharmaceutical industry (TWN Info Service on WTO Issues 8/27/03).
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2003) that export should be on “humanitarian” grounds only, meaning not for commercial 
profit.71  Because of public outcry, however, the U.S. eventually agreed to allow the language to 
be changed from "humanitarian" to that in the Chairperson’s Statement:  “the Decision should be 
used in good faith to protect public health and … not as an instrument to pursue industrial or 
commercial policy objectives."  
Given this language and given PhRMA’s historic concern about competition from Indian 
generics, it is quite likely that the U.S. will continue to argue that developing countries should not 
enter the export/compulsory license business if they do so in order to develop a competitive 
pharmaceutical industry and thereby gain comparative advantage in international trade.  In light 
of the U.S.’s concern over diversion, however, it is also possible that the U.S. is seeking to clarify 
that the ultimate destination of exported medicines must remain in the Global South and that 
drugs must not be re-exported through parallel importation or otherwise to the U.S. and E.U.; 
otherwise, the re-exporter would be pursuing industrial or commercial policy (namely making 
money on re-export).  A final plausible interpretation of the “industrial or commercial policy 
objective” clause is that the U.S. is trying to resurrect the private sector limitation that it had 
originally proposed pre-Doha.  A close analysis of the U.S. position suggests that it is primarily 
interested in deterring the emergence of an even stronger pharmaceutical sector in India.
In rebuttal to the U.S.’s preferred interpretation, public health and access advocates argue that no 
generic company is going to sell for long on a no-profit basis.  For the Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement to work at all, countries like India, and hopefully China, South 
Africa, Thailand, and Brazil, will have to become even bigger players in the production and 
export of generic medicines.  However, every time one of these exporting countries issues a 
compulsory license for export it would arguably be advancing an industrial and commercial 
policy of actually enabling a generic manufacturer to provide a sustainable source of supply of 
standard-quality, low-cost generics to countries that cannot product medicines efficiently on their 
own.  One could wish that the generic industry were altruistic enough to make HIV/AIDS and 
other medicines on a nonprofit basis, despite investing in productive capacity, fixed-dose 
combinations, and drug registration.  But even the new Clinton Foundation offer of $140 a year is 
premised on some slim margin of profit and a certain quantum of guaranteed purchases.72
3.1.6.  Conditions on compulsory licenses:  quantity terms and royalty rates
2.(b)  the compulsory license issued by the exporting Member under this Decision shall contain 
71 In a way, there is a refreshing frankness in the nakedness of the U.S./PhRMA position - "we don't want 
generic drug companies to make money, we want them to operate on a humanitarian, nonprofit basis even 
while we pursue monopoly-enhanced profit maximization."  Confirming this objective, in Montreal, at a 
July 30 press conference, USTR Zoellick expressly said that the U.S. does not was the new post-Doha 
system to become a loophole for creating a commercial export industry.  Inside U.S. Trade 
<http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-August/005045.html> (September 1, 2003).  Zoellick 
and PhRMA have consistently charged that the production-for-export system could be "abused" by the 
generic drug industries in Brazil, China, and most especially India.  To limit that “abuse,” the U.S./PhRMA 
team have attempted to limit markets by excluding middle-income developing countries and by excluding 
medicines for most diseases.  Here, they tried to go even further - they would let generic producers export, 
but only on a hypothetical "humanitarian and non-profit" basis.
72
 Aspen Pharmacare of South Africa, one of the Clinton Foundation’s suppliers (the others are Cipla, 
Ranbaxy, and Matrix, all of India), is already on record that it will earn a wafer thin margin of profit.  Amar 
Kahn, Clinton Aspen to Cut Price of AIDS Drugs, Business Day, Cape Town 
<http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200310240136.html > (October 24, 2003).
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the following conditions: 
      i.  only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member(s) may be 
manufactured under the license and the entirety of this production shall be exported to the 
Member(s) which has notified its needs to the Council for TRIPS; 
3.  Where a compulsory license is granted by an exporting Member under the system set out in 
this Decision, adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement shall be 
paid in that Member taking into account the economic value to the importing Member of the use 
that has been authorized in the exporting Member. Where a compulsory license is granted for the 
same products in the eligible importing Member, the obligation of that Member under Article 31(h) 
shall be waived in respect of those products for which remuneration in accordance with the first 
sentence of this paragraph is paid in the exporting Member.73
The Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement directly limits the quantity of medicines that can be 
produced for export by requiring that only an amount necessary to meet notified needs of all 
eligible Members shall be manufactured and that all medicines produced under the export license 
shall be exported rather than be sold domestically.  Fortunately, there is clarity in this provision 
that supply totals can be aggregated to include authorized demand from regional trade groups.
The second necessary condition on the license is a counter-intuitive obligation that the amount of 
royalty compensation be set in the exporting country rather than the importing country and that it 
be set according to the “economic value to the importing Member of the [authorized use].”  At 
first blush, this provision would seem to require exporting Members to rigorously investigate 
“economic value” in the importing country.  The more rational interpretation, however, is to 
recognize that the value need be only roughly proportional to importing-country GDP, degree of 
innovation, public vs. private research and development costs, prior earnings, remaining life of 
the patent, purpose of use, and perhaps other factors.  An even more rational solution is that the 
exporting country set a narrow range of presumptive royalty rates in line with common practice.  
An added paradox of this remuneration requirement is that it requires a royalty even if product is 
being produced for a country where the medicine is not patented.  In this regard, an importing 
poor country is worse off under the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement than it would have 
been if it had local capacity to produce medicines.  As the ultimate consumer, the importing, no-
patent Member will be required to pay the added cost of a license royalty even though there 
would have been no royalty on locally produced medicines.  This is yet another example of how 
the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement is unfairly biased against generic imports.
3.1.7   Product differentiation requirements
3.  the compulsory license issued by the exporting Member under this Decision shall contain the 
following conditions: 
ii.  products produced under the license shall be clearly identified as being produced 
under the system set out in this Decision through specific labeling or marking. Suppliers 
should distinguish such products through special packaging and/or special 
colouring/shaping of the products themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible 
and does not have a significant impact on price;74
73
 Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 16.
74 Id.
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The Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement contained a compromise on product differentiation.  
Developed countries and pharmaceutical interests had sought strong differentiation requirements 
so that there would be less temptation to divert nearly identical products from developing
countries to more lucrative developed country markets.  Developing countries, in contrast, 
worried about the economic impact of product differentiation and won concessions that such 
differentiation would not be required if it had “a significant impact on price.”  The U.S./PhRMA 
team, however, remained unsatisfied with this compromise and thus insisted on the insertion of 
the following language in the Chairman’s Statement.
Members recognize that the purpose of the Decision would be defeated if products supplied 
under this Decision are diverted from the markets for which they are intended. … It is the 
understanding of Members that in general special packaging and/or special colouring or shaping 
should not have a significant impact on the price of pharmaceuticals.  [Emphasis added.]
In the past, companies have developed procedures to prevent diversion of products that are, for 
example, provided through donor programmes. “Best practices” guidelines that draw upon the 
experiences of companies are attached to this statement for illustrative purposes. Members and 
producers are encouraged to draw from and use these practices, and to share information on 
their experiences in preventing diversion.
Attachment:  “Best practices” guidelines
Companies have often used special labelling, colouring, shaping, sizing, etc. to differentiate products 
supplied through donor or discounted pricing programmes from products supplied to other markets. 
Examples of such measures include the following:
• Bristol Myers Squibb used different markings/imprints on capsules supplied to sub Saharan Africa.
• Novartis has used different trademark names, one (Riamet®) for an anti-malarial drug provided to 
developed countries, the other (Coartem®) for the same products supplied to developing countries. 
Novartis further differentiated the products through distinctive packaging.
• GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) used different outer packaging for its HIV/AIDS medications Combivir, 
Epivir and Trizivir supplied to developing countries. GSK further differentiated the products by 
embossing the tablets with a different number than tablets supplied to developed countries, and 
plans to further differentiate the products by using different colours.
• Merck differentiated its HIV/AIDS antiretroviral medicine CRIXIVAN through special packaging and 
labelling, i.e., gold-ink printing on the capsule, dark green bottle cap and a bottle label with a light-
green background.
• Pfizer used different colouring and shaping for Diflucan pills supplied to South Africa.
Producers have further minimized diversion by entering into contractual arrangements with importers/
distributors to ensure delivery of products to the intended markets.
To help ensure use of the most effective anti-diversion measures, Members may share their experiences 
and practices in preventing diversion either informally or through the TRIPS Council. It would be beneficial 
for Members and industry to work together to further refine anti-diversion practices and enhance the sharing 
of information related to identifying, remedying or preventing specific occurrences of diversion. 75
Any requirement that exporters vary pill size, shape, and color is not cost-free, particularly when 
moving from round, white tablets or capsules of a standard size, to hexagogonal pills in different
75
 Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 58.  The Statement extended product differentiated rules to cover 
finished products produced from Paragraph 6 imported active ingredients.  “In this regard, the provisions of 
paragraph 2(b)(ii) apply not only to formulated pharmaceuticals produced and supplied under the system 
but also to active ingredients produced and supplied under the system and to finished products produced 
using such active ingredients.”  Id.
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sizes and colors.76  Although it may be sensible to have protections against using a proprietary 
name or identical packaging (possible trade mark infringements), there is no sense in adding 
dramatically to costs (and potentially altering bio-equivalence or bio-availability) by changing 
size, coating, and shape.  This unnecessary added cost burden is especially egregious when 
producers might have to change trade dress, size, and shape for multiple small markets.77
Although the Chairperson’s Statement adds a presumption that product differentiation does not 
adversely affect costs, developing countries and generic producers should be prepared to argue 
and document that they do.  Even more significantly, if product differentiation affects bio-
availability or bio-equivalence, they should argue that the differentiation is “infeasible” as well as 
uneconomical under the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.  Finally, developing countries 
should select the “best practices” with the least onerous terms, i.e., Novartis.
3.1.8   Other anti-diversion measures
4. In order to ensure that the products imported under the system set out in this Decision are 
used for the public health purposes underlying their importation, eligible importing Members 
shall take reasonable measures within their means, proportionate to their administrative 
capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to prevent re-exportation of the products that 
have actually been imported into their territories under the system. In the event that an 
eligible importing Member that is a developing country Member or a least-developed country 
Member experiences difficulty in implementing this provision, developed country Members 
shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and 
financial cooperation in order to facilitate its implementation.  [Emphasis added.]
5. Members shall ensure the availability of effective legal means to prevent the importation 
into, and sale in, their territories of products produced under the system set out in this 
Decision and diverted to their markets inconsistently with its provisions, using the means 
already required to be available under the TRIPS Agreement. If any Member considers that 
such measures are proving insufficient for this purpose, the matter may be reviewed in the 
Council for TRIPS at the request of that Member.78
The Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement requires importing Members to “take reasonable 
measures within their means, proportionate to their administrative capacity and to the risk of trade 
diversion to prevent re-exportation.”  Should their efforts to prevent re-exportation be “difficult,” 
then developing countries are obligated to seek mutually agreeable technical and financial 
cooperation from developed country Members.  Although this language imposes no directly 
enforceable obligations on importing Members with respect to any particular anti-diversion 
measure, it does suggest that pressure will be brought to bear regarding methods designed to 
reduce product diversion.
In addition to requiring product differentiation and administrative efforts against product 
diversion, the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement also requires a series of notifications from 
importing and exporting countries and the licensee concerning the identity of the licensed generic 
producer, the identity and quantities of drugs being produced and exported, and the distinguishing 
76




 Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 16.
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features of the products.79  Presumably this elaborative system of publicly available notifications 
is at least partially designed to enable proprietary drug companies to police product diversion.
3.1.9   A procedural morass
The Paragraph 6 notification scheme is elaborate enough, but it builds on the procedural 
complexity of double-licensing under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.  Under the discipline 
of the combined texts, in order to import medicines in a country where a drug has been patented, 
the following steps must be followed for a “routine” pro-public health license: 
(1) The importing country’s potential licensee(s) must seek a voluntary license80 on 
commercially reasonable terms for a commercially reasonable period of time from 
the patent holder.81 The importing country can ease this requirement by specifying a 
relatively short time for negotiations, e.g., 30 days, and by specifying presumptively 
reasonable and unreasonable terms (see discussion on regulation of voluntary 
licenses, subsection 4.2 infra).  
(2) Failing that, the potential licensee(s) must apply for a compulsory license from the 
importing country pursuant to procedures satisfying Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, including individual determinations, 31(a), limited scope and duration, 
31(c) and (g),82 non-exclusivity and non-assignability, 31(d) and (e), and rights of 
review, 31(i) and (j).     
(3) The importing country must assess its generic industry’s capacity and/or willingness 
to produce the medicine locally, and, if capacity is insufficient, it must notify the 
WTO of its decision or intention to issue a compulsory license, specify the names 
and expected quantities of the products needed83 and explain and justify its rationale 
concerning insufficient capacity, which rationale is subject to ad hoc challenge and 
review.84
(4) The importing country must license the potential exporter, presumably the one that 
has already engaged in voluntary license negotiations in the importing country, 
Article 31(b). 
79
 Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 16, Paragraph 2(a), (b)(iii), and (c).
80
 Non-exclusive voluntary licenses with relaxed geographical limitations could have a number of 
advantages.  In the best-case scenario, the patent holder could transfer technology and manufacturing 
know-how to the voluntary licensee which might produce greater efficiencies and ensure quality.  In 
addition, the patent holder would ordinarily allow its licensee to obtain registration by comparing bio-
availability and bio-equivalence of the generic product to confidential data previously filed with the drug 
registration authority.
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 Prior negotiation is not required under Article 31 (b) and (k) of the TRIPS Agreement where the license 
is being sought with respect to:  (1) an emergency or other matter of extreme urgency (note:  HIV/AIDS, 
TB, and malaria are presumptively such emergencies, Doha Declaration, Paragraph 5(c)); (2) 
governmental, non-commercial use; and (3) remedies for anti-competitive practices.
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  Article 31(c) limits a license to the purpose for which it was authorized; Article 31(g) mandates 
termination when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to reoccur; and the 
Annex to the Implementation Agreement limits it to the period of time that local capacity is insufficient.  In 
the event of ordinary public health licenses, the duration would be at least as long as the public health 
problem prevails.  However, the duration can be shortened further because of increased capacity in the 
domestic pharmaceutical sector.  Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 16, Annex, Option ii.
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 “This notification will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the WTO 
website dedicated to this Decision.”  Id. fn. 5. 
84 Id. Paragraph 2(a), Annex; Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 58.
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(5) The exporter may need to seek a voluntary license on commercially reasonable terms 
for a commercially reasonable period of time in the exporting country, though this 
requirement is needlessly duplicative and irrational.85
(6) The exporter must seek a fully TRIPS-compulsory license from its own government 
on a single-country, single-product basis, Article 31(a), (c), (d), (e), (g), (i), (j). 
(7) Compensation by royalty must be individually determined based on economic value 
in the importing country.86
(8) “The exporting Member shall notify the TRIPS Council of the grant of the license, 
including the conditions attached to it.  The information provided shall include the 
name and address of the licensee, the product(s) for which the licence has been 
granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted, the country(ies) to which the 
product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of the license.  The notification 
shall also indicate the address of the website [upon which the licensee posts its 
required notifications].” 87
(9) If a license is granted, the exporter must investigate pill size, shape, coloring, 
labeling, and packaging of the patent-holder’s product in the importing country and 
differentiate its new product in material respects, unless to do so is demonstrably too 
costly or infeasible. 
(10)Likewise, the licensee must post certain required information on a website before 
shipping detailing:  “the quantities being supplied to each destination … and the 
distinguishing features of the product(s).”88
(11)The generic producer will need to seek product registration and prove bio-
equivalence in the importing country despite the patent holder’s effort to prevent 
“unfair commercial use” of its confidential registration data (TRIPS Article 39.3).  
(12)This process must be fulfilled over and over again for each and every drug and for 
each and every country to which or from which the drug will be exported.  
Shrink the market, increase costs, and add burdensome procedural requirements - is that the 
simple and efficient solution promised at Doha?  The answer is obviously no.  The demand-end 
of the developed-country, post-Doha strategy was designed to dramatically shrink the potential 
market for generic drugs and to exclude virtually all markets with meaningful and stable 
purchasing power.  At the supply end, developed countries succeeded in increasing the risks and 
costs of producing generic medicines for export and in reducing the benefits.  In part, the risk 
factors and reduced benefits for generic producers include shrinking markets.  But, in addition, 
generic producers will be uncertain whether a particular country has properly determined that it 
lacks sufficient pharmaceutical capacity or whether there is a public health need – decisions that 
can result in review by the WTO and might also prompt lawsuits by patent-holders such as that 
previously filed against South Africa.89  Even more problematic, however, is the procedural 
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 Although this result seems unnecessarily duplicative, especially since the company involved probably 
first sought a voluntary license in the importing country, the current text of Article 31(b) and the failure of 
the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement to address this second negotiation would seem to require such 
a ridiculous result.
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 Despite a requirement of individual determinations, it seems likely that countries could issues guidelines 
for royalty rates and a presumptive range of royalty rates and that they could shift the burden of persuasion 
concerning the unreasonableness of the rate to the patent holder.
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 Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, supra note 16, Paragraph 2(c).  
88 Id., Paragraph 2(b)(iii).
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 The risk of pharmaceutical company law suits against governments will become far more likely if 
NAFTA-like investment rules are ever engrafted into WTO or other bilateral or plurilateral agreements. 
These clauses give “investors,” meaning foreign companies, rights to take governments to dispute 
resolution for damages if governmental policy undermines their property rights.  Although a full discussion 
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labyrinth that stands between a country desperately needing imported generics and a willing 
manufacturer where the drug is on-patent.
Unfortunately and for reasons are that hard to fathom, developing countries traded their citizens' 
health for long-promised and indefinitely-delayed reductions in farm export subsidizes and/or for 
temporary access to developed countries’ textile markets (before an even cheaper producer 
arrives on the scene).  Although culpability for the incredible shrinking Doha Declaration rests 
primarily with the U.S. (and secondarily with the E.U. and Japan), developing countries became 
co-complicit in enforcing a pharmaceutical embargo that risks millions of unnecessary deaths.  
Despite this critique, both of the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and of developing 
countries’ premature capitulation to developed country power, developing countries held firm on 
the scope of disease issue, on securing import/re-export rights for regional trade alliances, and on 
market exclusivity during extended transitional periods for least developed countries.90  It is also 
true that one loophole in the TRIPS agreement, the “predominantly for domestic use rule” was 
widened somewhat as a result of the August 30 accord.  
3.2  The Full Spectrum of Sourcing Alternatives for Developing Countries Post-Doha 
Fortunately, as demonstrated in Chart One below, developing countries retain a great deal of 
flexibility to use TRIPS-compliant mechanisms to access medicines from abroad, despite the 
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement though those some of these options will narrow in the 
future.  In this regard, it is important to note at the outset that there are now four nestled texts –
the original TRIPS Agreement, the subsequent Doha Declaration, the Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement, and the Chairperson’s Statement – which regulate the production and 
export of generic medicines and their importation.  In this regard, it is also important to remember 
that options within a particular country will also be circumscribed by national legislation and 
perhaps by its participation in bilateral or regional trade agreements that limit rights it might 
otherwise have under the four international agreements referenced above. 
of the investment rule is far beyond the scope of this paper, developing countries should be aware of the 
future risks of current policy proposals. 
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 Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration had granted least developed countries an exemption from TRIPS 
compliance with respect to pharmaceutical products until January 1, 2016.  On June 27, 2002, the TRIPS 
Council voted an addition waiver that would exempt least developed countries from providing five years of 
market exclusivity to pharmaceutical products under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement.   
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Chart One – Flexibilities for Import/Export
3.2.1  No patent options
Many different kinds of exporters are currently permitted to sell generics for export where they 
are not covered by patent protection in the exporting countries.  Countries permitted to export, 
depending on their own national legislation, include:
(1) non-WTO members that can produce and export medicines without WTO complications 
because of their non-membership, though they might have national legislation protecting 
patents which would forestall their rights to produce and export generic versions of 
patented medicines;
(2) least developed countries that do not have to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products or processes until 2016, although many do so prematurely or under pressure; 
again national legislation should be amended to permit such production and export; 
(3) countries that did not start granting patents on medicines until compelled to do so by the 
TRIPS Agreement and thus who can make generic versions of pre-1995 drugs legally 
even without a compulsory license; and 
(4) countries like India, who did not have patent production for pharmaceutical "products" in 
1994 but only for pharmaceutical “processes” and thus have until 2005 to become fully 
TRIPS-compliant.  
In the meantime and into the future, India can continue to make lawful copies of pre-1995 
medicines for export without restriction and will continue to be able to do so indefinitely – the 
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and the Chairman's Statement arguably have nothing to 
do with this.  The story for post-1995 medicines is more complicated because of a “mailbox rule” 
in Article 70 of the TRIPS Agreement.  Under the so-called "mailbox" rule countries like India 
that are supposed to hold post-1995 patent applications in a “mailbox” pending their TRIPS 
compliance in 2005.  At that time, the patent application would be given priority and the patent, if 
granted, would extend for the remainder of its 20-year term.  Moreover, even while the patent 
IMPORTING COUNTRY (right to import 
if:)
1. Parallel importation if country has 
international exhaustion rule, TRIPS Art. 
6; may permit importation of drug 
produced under compulsory license in 
exporting country (parallel importation)
2. Regular compulsory license for import, 
Art. 31 (import allowed pursuant to Art. 
27)
3. No patent on file (mainly in smaller and 
poorer countries)
4. Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement 
compulsory license for import with all 
attendant notifications and limitations.
EXPORTING COUNTRY (right to export, if:)
1. Exportation of a drug first sold by the patent holder 
or with its permission (for parallel importation, no 
quantity restrictions)
2. Post-patent or off-patent drug (no quantity limits)
3. No patent filed or patent found to be invalid
4. National patent regime did not patent pre-1995 
drugs (no retroactivity, no quantity limits)
5. Compulsory license predominantly for domestic 
use, Art. 31(f), (49% can be exported)
6. Compulsory license for abuse of patent, Art. 31(k), 
(unlimited export)
7. Limited exception to effectuate compulsory license 
in importing country with no capacity or 
insufficient market on humanitarian grounds, Art. 
30.
8. Limited exception to permit export to a no 
capacity/no patent market on humanitarian 
grounds, Art.30.
9. Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement, 
compulsory license with all attendant notifications 
and limitations,(will be required for post-1995 
mailbox drugs and post 2005 new drug inventions; 
limited quantities.
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application is waiting in the “mailbox,” the patent holder is supposed to be given five years of 
marketing exclusivity once the product has been registered for distribution by the country’s 
medicines registration agency.  India has just granted its first exclusive marketing rights to a 
“mailbox” cancer drug, Glivec.  Fourteen other pipeline applications have been filed but several, 
including Roche’s Saquinavir, have been rejected for not fulfilling the required criteria.91
Brazilian/Indian Example
In September of 2003, Brazil took the first steps towards issuing a compulsory license to import generic 
antiretroviral drugs from India.  It did so by means of a presidential decree that created a juridical 
mechanism for generic importation in the case of national emergency or national interest.  Through 
negotiations with Abbott Laboratories, Merck & Co. and Roche, proprietary owners of Lopinavir, Efavirez, 
and Nelfinavir respectively, Brazil was seeking cheaper sources of supply because it was spending 63% of 
its $573 million ARV budget on these three medicines alone.  On November 19, 2003, only Merck had 
settled with Brazil after granting a 25% price break on Efavirez (savings $10 million).  However, Bristol-
Myers Squibb, a fourth company announced a 76% discount on Atazanavir, producing a $60 million annual 
saving for Brazil.
Admittedly, Brazil has a highly competent generic industry, led by the Far-Manguinhos state laboratory, 
which has been producing seven non-patent protected ARVs locally.  This local production capacity and 
the credible threat of compulsory licenses have dramatically reduced Brazil’s annual costs per patient for 
antiretroviral therapy.  However, even while Brazil evaluates its internal pharmaceutical production 
capacity and while Far-Manguinhos investigates the development processes of these three newer ARVs, 
Brazil is seeking to fill a temporary gap in its ability to source these drugs locally.
India is producing the three drugs in question lawfully because its patent system currently protects 
processes only.  Thus, it can export reverse-engineered and differently produced drugs lawfully to any 
country where there is no patent bar.  Because the drugs themselves are not patent protected in India, this 
entire transaction is not subject to the new Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.  Instead, India can 
produce and export any quantity it desires and Brazil can override the existing patents with an ordinary 
compulsory license.   
3.2.2   Parallel imports
Parallel importation is importation, without the direct consent of the patent-holder, of a product 
voluntarily and legally marketed in another country by the patent-holder or by another authorized 
party. The rationale for permitting parallel importing is to promote price competition for patented 
products by allowing importation of patented products marketed at a lower price in another 
country by or with the consent of the patent-holder. This indirect competition with oneself was 
thought to increase the likelihood of fair pricing between countries.  
In TRIPS terminology, a patent-holder's right to limit distribution of a product after its first sale 
has been "exhausted" once the product has been marketed by or with the consent of the patent-
holder.  Almost all countries have a minimal principle of national exhaustion, permitting resale 
within a country after a first sale; such resale is necessary to the ordinary movement of products 
through the wholesale and retail distribution system.  In addition to this minimal provision, some 
countries have adopted an international exhaustion rule, meaning that products can be lawfully 
imported from a foreign source once the patent holder or its licensee had made a profit (exhausted 
its rights) via the original sale of the product.  
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 Novartis receives EMR for Glivec, <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-
November/005611.html> (Nov. 14, 2003).
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The TRIPS Agreement does not prohibit member countries from adopting the principle of 
international exhaustion; in fact, it explicitly permits it.  That permission starts with Article 6 
which states that disputes relating to exhaustion are not subject to the WTO dispute settlement 
process.  Although the U.S. and E.U. argued that Article 27.1 barred parallel importation, despite 
the Article 6 rule, any doubts on this score were eliminated by the Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha 
Declaration, which expressly recognized Members’ right to elect their own exhaustion rule and 
thereafter to parallel import.  
Under an even more liberal interpretation, a country that recognizes “international exhaustion” 
might be permitted to import drugs produced under a compulsory license issued in another 
country, even if there were no compulsory license issued in the importing state.  Pursuant to this 
analysis, parallel importation would be TRIPS-compliant because rights would have been 
exhausted (or permission for sale would have been granted) by the compulsory licensee.92  The 
uncertainty in using this approach, however, is whether the product would be considered to have 
been “permissibly” placed in the stream of commerce if the product were being produced 
pursuant to an “involuntary” or compulsory license.
The pharmaceutical industry is highly critical of parallel importation because it limits companies’ 
ability to charge whatever a local market will bear.  It also potentially reduces profits in high-
price countries, but only if consumers can lawfully obtain cheaper sources of supply with a lower 
profit margin elsewhere.  To allay this risk, most developed countries have imposed significant 
restrictions on parallel importation of medicines.  For example, the U.S. prohibits the practice 
completely except for consumer’s personal supply of medicines purchased abroad, whereas the 
E.C. permits regional importation only between members of the European Union.  In addition, 
pharmaceutical companies have several private options to circumvent parallel importation rules.  
The most Draconian would be to impose a uniform high price worldwide thereby decreasing 
affordability in middle-income and low-income nations.  Other solutions are more subtle.  For 
example, a company could limit its supply to a low-price country to an amount sufficient for 
internal consumption only.  This strategy is already being pursued by some patent holders in 
Canada where U.S. consumers are beginning to engage in a larger volume of internet sales with 
Canadian distributors.93  Alternatively, especially in a price-control jurisdiction, a company could 
charge two prices, one for domestic consumption and a second for export products.94
Although there are many contexts where activists would disapprove of protective anti-parallel 
pricing practices by multinational pharmaceuticals, prohibitions against parallel export/import 
probably make the most sense when a company has been “convinced” to make major price 
concessions to a particular developing country or region, as in the Accelerating Access Initiative.  
However, a more progressive analysis would not necessarily object to parallel export/import to 
other developing countries not yet reached by concessionary or discount pricing.  Oxfam and 
others have addressed this dilemma by proposing that there be one parallel import rule for 
developing countries and another for developed countries.  Although developing countries would 
be free to parallel import from any cheaper branded source, developed countries would not be 
permitted to parallel import from nations receiving concessionary pricing.95
3.2.3 Article 31(b), (f) compulsory licenses – non-predominant quantities
92
 Carlos Correa advocates this approach, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in 
Developing Countries, Section X.2 (2000).
93
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94
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If authorized by local law, Article 31 of TRIPS permits a competent government authority, 
including a health or patent department, to license the manufacture, sale, and use of an invention 
to an authorized third-party or government agency without the consent of the patent-holder.  
Although such licenses could stimulate price-lowering competition and ensure availability of 
needed medicines, no developing nation has yet issued a compulsory license for HIV/AIDS 
medicines, though an application is pending in South Africa and licenses have been threatened on 
several occasions by Brazil. Complicating any such effort is the fact that few developing 
countries have comprehensive compulsory licensing clauses in their patent legislation.  Even as 
developing countries amend their intellectual property regimes to become TRIPS compliant, 
many of them are not taking advantage of the TRIPS-compliant compulsory license provisions 
that exist.
The permissible grounds for compulsory licenses are not fully enumerated or delimited in the 
TRIPS Agreement, and thus developing nations have significant discretion in selecting health 
sensitive policies.  Permissible grounds for compulsory licensing include public health and the 
public interest broadly defined, see Article 8, national emergencies and matters of extreme 
urgency such as epidemics, Article 31(b), public non-commercial or governmental use, id., and/or 
to remedy anti-competitive practices, Article 31(k) (discussed further in the following sub-
section).  Some of these grounds justify expedited governmental action.  For example, under 
Article 31(b), when the government declares an emergency or a matter of extreme urgency, such 
as the AIDS pandemic, it could seek a compulsory license for itself, or for an authorized third 
party, to begin commercial exploitation without first negotiating with the patent holder.  
Similarly, when the government is seeking a license for public, non-commercial use, the 
government or its authorized agent is not required to seek prior approval and it can limit the 
patent-holder’s remedies to review of the amount of compensation.  Article 42.  Finally, under 
Article 31(k), if the government acts to redress anti-competitive practices or abuse of patent, it 
can both reduce the amount of compensation to the patent holder and distribute the product 
without quantity restrictions outside the domestic market. 
Although TRIPS is relatively indifferent about the grounds for issuing a compulsory license, it is 
relatively strict about the procedures that must be followed in order for an ordinary license to be 
granted.  Except in cases of governmental, non-commercial use, cases arising from anti-
competitive practice, or cases involving emergency or extreme urgency, the government is 
ordinarily required to seek a voluntary licensee on commercially reasonable grounds for a 
reasonable period of time.  Article 31(b).  In addition, as previously stated, the licensee is 
required to pay adequate compensation.  Article 31(h).  Despite a requirement of case-specific 
determinations, however, it might be appropriate to set forth factors affecting royalty rates 
including public expenditures, inventiveness, research and development costs, remaining life of 
the patent, purpose of use, and other valid factors.  Alternatively, countries could specify 
relatively modest royalties in the range of 2-10% that have become traditional in the 
pharmaceutical field.96
Even if a compulsory license is granted, the patent-holder retains its underlying intellectual 
property rights in the patent.  The license granted is non-exclusive, meaning the patent-holder and 
its other licensees can still compete; moreover, the license is non-assignable.  Article 31(d).  More 
significantly, the license is revocable once the circumstances that led to its granting have ceased 
96
 James Love, Access to Medicine and Use of Patents Without the Permission of the Patent Owner:  
Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, ¶¶ 35-42.  Canada’s proposed royalty rate in its 
pending patent law amendment is a flat 2%.
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to exist, though some consideration must be given to the interests of the licensee who may have 
invested heavily in order to manufacture the licensed product.  Article 31(c) and (g). This 
possibility of revocation creates barriers to entry in developing countries even in those rare 
circumstances where they have sufficient drug manufacturing capacity to produce drugs locally.
One of the most problematic features of the compulsory license regime is that licenses be issued 
“predominantly for the supply of the domestic market,” except in cases of patent abuse where this 
limit does not apply.  Article 31(f), (k).  The meaning of this “domestic supply” requirement is 
inherently unclear as it might mean that “the predominant portion of products produced must be 
consumed domestically” or alternatively that “the license shall be predominantly for the benefit
of domestic consumption.”97  With the latter interpretation, a country would be justified in 
exporting a major portion of its production, if such export were necessary in order to have large 
production runs so as to efficiently supply the domestic market.  This is the preferable 
interpretation of Article 31(f) because it could result in a regional manufacturer being able to 
supply several small markets in order to achieve cost efficient economies-of-scale.  Under any 
interpretation, however, an importing country could utilize a non-Paragraph 6 compulsory license 
to import the non-predominate portion of an exporting country’s generic product.
3.2.4 Article 31(k) compulsory license
Fortunately, as referenced above, there is a predominately-for-the-domestic-market exception in 
Article 31(k) where a patent-holder has been found to have anti-competitively abused its patent, 
by excessive pricing or otherwise, in the producing country.  In these circumstances, a generic 
producer operating under a compulsory license could produce on a large scale for export, most 
relevantly even where a non-special, non-Paragraph-6 compulsory license had been granted in the 
importing country.  Since TRIPS provides no definition of what might constitute an anti-
competitive practice and since Article 1 states that Members should “determine the appropriate 
method of implementing the provisions of [TRIPS] within their own legal system and practice,” it 
seems clear that individual countries are permitted to develop definitions of anti-competitive 
behavior so long as they are not transparently TRIPS-nullifying.  In this regard, Article 40 
directly empowers Member states to address anti-competitive practices in licensing agreements.
By their very nature, drug patents are anti-competitive because they ordinarily enable the patent 
holder to exclude other manufacturers and vendors.  Therefore, although “normal” exploitation of 
patent rights might not constitute an anti-competitive practice, excessive prices and refusals to 
license might be held anti-competitive in particular settings, particularly where a pharmaceutical 
product dominates a therapeutic class, where product substitution is not feasible, and where a 
supra-competitive price prevails.  
Given that many competition schemes are designed to prohibit excessive pricing, it is possible to 
argue that high prices are unwarranted especially where there is market domination for a 
particular drug because of the impracticability of product substitution and where the drug is 
considered an essential commodity.  This argument is bolstered when it can be shown that 
excessive pricing effectively eliminates product availability for a large class of poorer consumers, 
creating a disproportionate dead-weight loss whereby the vast majority of patients lack affordable 
access to the medicine.  If medicines are not being provided on a reasonably affordable basis, 
bearing some reasonable relation to the costs of production, then a country could issue a 
97 Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS:  The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual 
Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 1069, 1075-1094 (1996).
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compulsory license under Article 31(k) on the basis of exploitative pricing. Other factors may add 
to the argument for compulsory licenses, including the fact that the medicines was discovered and 
developed with public money, as many AIDS drugs were.98  Another price-related anti-
competitive practice might be the now routine practice of patent holders discriminating in prices 
offered to the public and private sector and the practice of price differentiation among countries.  
Since price discrimination is frowned upon in many competition schemes, discriminatory pricing 
might justify the issuance of a license.
An even more promising competition theory is one that combines exploitative pricing and 
exclusionary practices, e.g., refusals to license generic competitors, where the combined effect 
creates an access gap for the product.  If the patent holder charges a supra-competitive price and 
if this price is traceable, at least in part to its refusal to license its patent to generic competitors, 
then this too could be found to be an actionable exclusionary practice.  The more radical form of 
this analysis is that each patent is, in essence, an essential facility and that the patent holder 
should ordinarily make this patent available to competitors in developing countries once they 
have obtained approval to market the medicine.  An alternative, less radical access-gap theory 
focuses on the issue of downstream innovation, product improvement, or product combinations.  
Under this version, the essential facilities doctrine is utilized where a follow-on product cannot be 
marketed without the approval or a license from one or more patent holder.99  This doctrine has 
particular utility with respect to fixed-dose combination medicines100 and other product 
improvements.  Drug companies do not make fixed-dose combinations of the most effective ARV 
combinations because patents on the different medicines are held by different companies and 
those companies have been unwilling thus far to cross-license medicines with competitors.101
This refusal has had negative public health consequences because it increases patients’ pill 
burden and complicates patient compliance with complex pill-taking schedules.  Generic 
companies, on the other hand, face no such constraint and gladly produce combination medicines 
when patent rules do not prevent them from doing so.  
South African example
These arguments are no longer theoretical.  On October 16, 2003, the South African Competition 
Commission announced a finding upholding a complaint by the Treatment Action Campaign and others 
against two pharmaceutical giants, GlaxoSmithKline South Africa and Boehringer Ingelheim, and holding 
that both companies had charged excessive prices for their patent-protected antiretroviral medicines.  The 
ruling further held that they had unlawfully refused to issue voluntary licenses to generic competitors and 
that they had thereby unreasonably restricted access to an essential facility102 preventing production of 
fixed-dose combination medicines.   
98 Public Citizen’s Prescription Drug Update – Drug Company Profits (Oct. 11, 2000) (a 38% return on equity, making 
the pharmaceutical industry the most profitable sector in the U.S. economy).
99 Cf. Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson and Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine under U.S. 
Antitrust Law, 70 Antitrust Law Journal 443 (2002); Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual 
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100
 Fixed-dose combinations put three different antiretroviral drugs into a single pill.  The WHO endorsed 
fixed-dose medicines as a crucial component of its ambitious plan to help the world treat 3 million people 
living with AIDS by the end of 2005.  WHO Scaling up antiretroviral therapy in resource-limited settings:  
Treatment guidelines for a public health approach, 9-13 (Dec. 2003); WHO & UNAIDS, Treating 3 
Million by 2005:  Making it happen – the WHO Strategy (Dec. 2003).    
101
 GlaxoSmithKline does make a fixed dose of its own patented ARVs and one of these, Combivir, is an 
important therapy.  However, Trimune, its three-medicine, fixed-dose combination is no longer a 
recommended therapy.
102 Under Section 8 of the South African Competition Act “[i]t is prohibited for a dominant firm to – refuse 
to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is economically feasible to do so.”  Under the 
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Menzi Simelane, Commission at the Competition Commission, said in the Commission’s media release that 
“Our investigation revealed that each of the firms has refused to license their patents to generic 
manufacturers in return for a reasonable royalty. We believe that this is feasible and that consumers will 
benefit from cheaper generic versions of the drugs concerned. We will request the Tribunal to make an 
order authorising any person to exploit the patents to market generic versions of the respondents patented 
medicines or fixed dose combinations that require these patents, in return for the payment of a reasonable 
royalty. In addition, we will recommend a penalty of 10% of the annual turnover of the respondents' ARVs 
in South Africa for each year that they are found to have violated the Act."
In response to the looming threat of punishing hearings before the Competition Tribunal in South Africa, 
on December 10, GSK and BI both announced voluntary licensing agreements with the complainants.  
Under the terms of the settlement agreement, negotiated in the shadow of threatened anti-competitive-
practices compulsory licenses, (1) sales will be permitted in public, private, and NGO sectors; (2) there will 
be an expand geographical scope permitting manufacturers to reach efficient economies of scale so long as 
they produce the medicines in South Africa; (3) the licenses are open to a reasonable number of producers 
(four for GSK and three for BI); (4) the licenses permit combination of licenses and production of fixed-
dose medicines; and (5) they are be based on modest royalties of 5% only.
3.2.5 Legal certainty concerning post-Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement
sourcing flexibilities 
Some commentators have been concerned that the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and 
Chairman’s Statement might somehow compromise or limit flexibilities for accessing imported 
generics that existed under previous agreements.  This is not a credible concern with respect to 
the four no-patent options first described above, nor even for the Article 31(f) and Article 31(k) 
options.  Paragraph 9 of the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement reads as follows:
This Decision is without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities that Members have 
under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement other than paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31, 
including those reaffirmed by the Declaration, and to their interpretation.  It is also without 
prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical products produced under a compulsory licence 
can be exported under the present provisions of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.
This paragraph expressly acknowledges all of the no-patent options outlined above.  Likewise, it 
does not directly limit rights under 31(k) nor non-predominate amounts under 31(f).  
3.2.6 Limited exceptions under Article 30
Paragraph 9 might be interpreted even more liberally to mean that the Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement does not exclude the possibility of Article 30 production in an 
exporting country.  Although there is no direct sanction for an Article 30 approach, the “Decision 
Act, an “‘essential facility’ means an infrastructure or resources that cannot reasonably be duplicated, and 
without access to which competitors cannot reasonably provide goods or services to their customers.”  One 
possible interpretation of the essential facility doctrine, read against the background of the constitutional 
duty to interpret legislation to “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights” (sec. 39), 
including the right of everyone to access to health services (sec. 27), is that the Competition Act imposes an 
obligation on the respondents to license their patented products on reasonable terms when to do so serves 
public health priorities.  Specifically, it is the conclusion of this report that the essential facility doctrine 
should be used as a basis for compulsory licensing of the products subject to the complaint to enable 
consumer access to fixed-dose combination drugs (FDCs) that provide multiple ARVs in a single pill.
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is without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities that Members have under the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement other than paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31,” and Article 
30 is still one of those flexibilities.
The text of Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement certainly evidences enough flexibility to justify 
limited exceptions designed to address the public health needs of the developing world, including 
those arising for poor countries that are not able to make effective use of compulsory licenses 
because they lack meaningful capacity to manufacture medicines locally.  
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided 
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into account the 
legitimate interest of third parties. (Emphases added.) 
As a guiding interpretive principle, it is important to recognize that Article 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement authorizes member countries to consider public health and public interests needs 
when drafting their patent laws “provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement.”  Similarly, Article 7 provides that intellectual property rights “should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, 
to the mutual advantage of producers and users . . . in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”  For these two provisions to mean anything, 
they should mean that member states can balance public health, public interest, and consumer 
needs in some affirmative way that impacts the unfettered exercise of patent rights.  Thus, given 
the extent of the public health problems in developing countries and given the realities that many 
developing countries cannot produce medicines locally, it makes sense under public health, trade, 
and human rights principles to fashion limited exceptions that permit the exportimport of 
generic medicines to those poor nations.
The language of Article 30 supports an interpretation that some significant impact on patent rights 
is permissible.  For example, the first requirement of Article 30 is that the exception must be 
limited.  Although “limited” does not mean that total abrogation of patents would be permitted, it 
must mean that some impact is possible, such as the quite significant impact of the “Bolar” 
exception,103 which can accelerate approval of generic competition by as much as three years 
costing the patent holder millions, even billions, of dollars.  Similarly, the second and third 
clauses of Article 30 permit some conflict with the normal exploitation of a patent, though not an 
“unreasonable conflict,” and some prejudice to the legitimate interests of the patent owner, 
though not “unreasonable prejudice.”  Lawyers are used to talking about the meaning of what is 
“unreasonable,” but once again the language necessarily suggests that some conflict and some 
prejudice is permissible – so long as the limited exception does not go too far.  
When producing for export only under an Article 30 limited exception, there is no real 
curtailment of the patent holder’s rights in the consuming country.  If that country had 
manufacturing capacity, it could produce medicines own its own.  Since it does not, a limited 
exception simply gives no-capacity countries a legal source of off-site manufacture, leveling their 
playing field vis-à-vis countries with productive capacity.  If the medicine were on-patent in the 
importing country, the importer would pay a previously determined royalty fee.  Alternatively, if 
103 Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS114/R, March 17, 2000 
[hereinafter Generic Medicines].  In Generic Medicines, the panel found that manufacture before patent expiration so as 
to register a medicine, the so-called “Bolar” exception was lawful, but that a six-month stock-piling rule was unlawful.  
In particular to the point under discussion, Generic Medicines found that any exception which resulted in a “substantial 
curtailment of [any exclusionary right] cannot be considered a limited exception.”  Id. at paragraph 7.44.
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the medicine were off-patent in the importing country, then its consumers would not be 
unreasonably burdened by a royalty imposed in the exporting country.
Fortunately, the language of Article 30 does not suggest that only the patent holder’s rights be 
considered; instead, it requires that the exception be judged “taking account of the legitimate 
interests of third parties” including presumably millions of poor people living with HIV/AIDS 
and other treatable diseases.  There is no geographical scope given about “third parties” who 
count, and thus the legitimate interests of third parties living in developing countries weigh 
heavily.  This last proviso strongly suggests that Article 30 incorporates a principle of 
proportionality such that if the public health interests of third parties are substantial, then a more 
significant limitation on patent rights is permissible.  In the real world, if these “third parties” in 
developing countries do not get the lowest-price, assured-quality generics available, they will die.
3.2.7   The Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement
The real difficulties of the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and Chairman’s Statement 
concern post-1995 discoveries and arise much more broadly in 2005 when no one but non-WTO 
members, least developed countries, and/or companies in WTO member countries that have 
issued compulsory licenses will be able to manufacture and export a patented medicine.  It is at 
this time that countries like India will have to become fully TRIPS compliant and will have to 
provide patent protection for post-1995 pipeline/mailbox patent applications and for all post 2005 
discoveries if a patent has been filed and granted.  
The Implementation Agreement also applies to countries where a medicine is currently on patent 
and where it seeks to export more than 49% of the product under a non-competition-remedy 
compulsory license.  Thus, for example, were Nigeria to seek becoming a regional producer and 
exporter in Southern Africa, it would need to issue Implementation Agreement-compliant 
compulsory licenses.  On the more immediate horizon, Canada would need to do so also if it 
succeeds in amending its patent legislation as promised.
The Canadian Example – Pending Legislation
On Thursday, November 6, 2003, the Canadian government introduced a bill that would amend its Patent 
Act to provide for the issuance of compulsory licenses that would allow Canadian generic manufactures to 
make and export generic versions of patented pharmaceutical products to developing countries lacking their 
own manufacturing capacity.  Canadian NGOs and the UN Special Envoy on HIV/AIDS in Africa, Stephen 
Lewis, had urged the government to take this initiative following the August 30 Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement.  Canadian civil society organizations are reportedly pleased that the proposed 
bill did not authorize compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals only to treat specific diseases or to address 
only  "emergencies" or other circumstances of extreme urgency as initially reported.  However civil society 
organizations identified some serious flaws in the bill as introduced.104
(1) Provisions permitting patent-holders a right of first refusal to block export licenses.  The bill includes 
provisions that give the company holding the Canadian patent on a pharmaceutical product the right of first 
refusal to take over contracts negotiated by generic pharmaceutical manufacturers with developing country 
governments or other authorized importers.  In order to do so, the patent-holding company would have 30 
days to meet the terms of the contract negotiated between the Canadian generic producer and the 
developing country purchaser.  Under the Bill as drafted, if the patent-holder takes over the contract the 
patent holder would be relieved from any obligation to negotiate the terms of a voluntary license for the 
104 See Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Update:  Amendment to Canada’s Patent Act to Authorize 
Export of Generic Pharmaceuticals, www.aidslaw.ca (Nov. 10, 2003).
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generic manufacturer to make and export the product and the Commissioner of Patents would be prohibited 
from issuing a compulsory license to the generic company.  Under such a legislative scheme, generic 
manufacturers might quickly lose incentive to negotiate export contracts in the first place.  Instead the 
patent-holder would be able to repeatedly block the generic manufacturer from obtaining the export license 
needed to make the product and fulfill the contract.  
(2) Limited list of pharmaceutical products. The bill lists pharmaceutical products for which a compulsory 
license may be obtained, limited to patented medicines on the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines.  
The bill also contemplates that the Canadian Cabinet could authorize the addition (or removal) of any other 
"patented product that may be used to address public health problems."  Given the protracted battle over 
disease limitations post-Doha, a limited list of products represents a step backward and is certainly not 
required by the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement. 
 (3) Denial of benefit to developing countries that are not WTO members.  Under the proposed bill, all 
countries recognized as "least-developed countries" could benefit from the export of generic 
pharmaceutical products as could developing country WTO members.  However, developing countries that 
do not belong to the WTO are unable to benefit from the possibility of importing generic pharmaceuticals 
from Canada.  There is no sound basis for excluding such countries from potentially under this legislation.   
4.    LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN IMPORTING AND EXPORTING COUNTRIES
In order for any exportation of on-patent medicines to be lawful, whether pursuant to exhaustion 
rules, an Article 31(f) or 31(k) compulsory license, or an Article 30 limited exception, there must 
be enabling legislation in the exporting country permitting such exportation.  Likewise, there 
must also be provisions for issuance of import compulsory licenses in importing nations where 
medicines are under patent.  Accordingly, in order to maximize their future flexibilities, most 
countries should enact legislation with respect being both an importer and an exporter of generic 
medicines.  
A previous review of developed country patent laws reveals that few of them have incorporated 
pro-public health flexibilities into their patent schemes.  For example, only thirteen countries 
have adopted legislation permitting issuance of voluntary licenses to address public health 
emergencies, only eleven to remedy anti-competitive practices, and only four for failure to 
license.105  Moreover, another constellation of developing and least developed countries has 
prematurely adopted TRIPS compliant legislation and in some cases TRIPS-plus legislation.  
Thus, in order to secure the hard fought gains in the Doha Declaration and the Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement, developing countries must quickly operationalize all the flexibilities 
they have achieved by amending national legislation as outlined in Chart Two below.
Chart Two Legislative Reform
Legislative Reform in Importing Country Legislative Reform in Exporting Country
1. Authority to grant compulsory licenses on all 
permissible grounds:
a. For emergencies and other matters of 
extreme urgency without prior 
notification (TRIPS Art. 31(b)); would 
be wise to designate HIV/AIDS, TB, 
and malaria as public health matters of 
extreme urgency not subject to 
emergency declaration standards, 
1. Authority to grant regular compulsory 
license on all permissible grounds 
(emergencies, governmental/non-
commercial use, public health, and to 
remedy anti-competitive practices) (TRIPS 
Art. 31(b),  31(k), Doha Declaration ¶ 5(b) 
and (c);
2. Authority to export non-predominate 
quantities pursuant to a regular compulsory 
105
 Carlos Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
13who/edm/par/2002.3 (WHO Health Economics and Drugs EDM Series No. 12, 2002). 
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constitutional or legislative (Doha 
Declaration ¶ 5(c));
b. For governmental non-commercial use 
without prior notification (TRIPS Art. 
31(b);
c. On other public health grounds for any 
diseases and medical conditions 
requiring access to more affordable 
pharmaceutical products (TRIPS Art. 
31(b), Doha Declaration ¶ 5(b))
d. To remedy anti-competitive practices 
and therefore to be able to export to 
other countries (TRIPS Art. 31(k), Art. 
40):
i. Abusive or excessive pricing 
leading to a gap in access 
(S.A. Comp. Comm.);
ii. Refusal to issue voluntary 
licenses (S.A. Comp. Comm.);
iii. Essential technology or 
essential facilities doctrine 
especially important with 
respect to sourcing fixed-dose 
combination medicines (S.A. 
Comp Comm.)
iv. Any and all other anti-
competitive practices;
e. Stipulation that all such licenses can be 
satisfied by local production and/or
import (TRIPS Art. 27.1)
f. Special compulsory licenses for import 
when country determines it lacks 
capacity to manufacture efficiently or 
timely domestically (Para. 6 
Implementation Agreement);
g. Ability to register generics via 
comparison to confidential data (TRIPS 
Art. 39.3). 
2. International exhaustion regime allowing 
parallel importation (TRIPS Art. 6, Doha 
Declaration ¶ 5(d)).
3. Ability to export regionally if part of a regional 
trade agreement (Paragraph 6 Implementation 
Agreement ¶ 6(i)).
license (TRIPS Art. 31(f) and authority to 
export unlimited quantities in the event of 
practices found anti-competitive (TRIPS 
Art. 31(k), see 1.d grounds for issuing 
licenses for anti-competitive practices).
3. Authority to grant compulsory licenses on 
the basis of notification of a member 
developing country to the TRIPS Council 
pursuant to the Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement;
a. Should allow simplified 
procedures;
b. Should allow joint consideration of 
concurrent licenses on multiple 
drugs and for multiple importers;
c. Must require notification, 
procedures and limitations of the 
Paragraph 6 Implementation 
Agreement and perhaps the 
Chairperson’s Statement)
4. Authority to produce medicines for export 
based on a Paragraph 6 request as a 
limited exception (TRIPS Art. 30 –
untested);
5. Authority to produce medicines for export 
on humanitarian grounds as a limited 
exception (TRIPS Art. 30 – untested);
6. Authority for wholesalers and other buyers 
to export patented medicines already sold 
by patent holders to other developing 
countries to satisfy their parallel 
importation needs (TRIPS Art. 6);
a. Consider making it an anti-
competitive practice for a patent 
holder to restrict quantities or to 
place contract limits on right to 
“parallel export;”
7. Require least costly methods of 
differentiation required to satisfy the 
Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement’s 
provisions concerning danger of product 
diversion.
8. Encourage technology transfer to 
developing countries without capacity to 
manufacture medicines.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest actual language for amendment of domestic 
legislation.  However, developing countries should be leery of technical assistance on these 
questions from traditional sources.  Despite refraining from comprehensively addressing all the 
permutations of legislative reform, this paper will directly address two areas of special concern:  
competition policy and competition-related regulation of voluntary licenses.
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4.1   Competition policy reform
One of the principle innovations in the list above is that developing countries pay close attention 
to their competition policy as well as their patent law.  As the South African Competition 
Commission case demonstrates, aggressive competition policy can be a formidable weapon in 
countries’ efforts to obtain access to generics and to achieve economies-of-scale by inclusion of 
non-domestic markets.  Because of the path-breaking nature of South Africa’s emerging 
competition law, this subsection will analyze the application of that law in some depth so that 
other developing country members might consider the wisdom of adopting similar or improved 
measures.
Section 56 of the South African Patents Act 57 of 1978, as amended by the Intellectual Property 
Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997, covers four specific circumstances whereby "(1) any 
interested person who can show that the rights in a patent are being abused may apply to the 
commissioner in the prescribed manner for a compulsory license under the patent."106 The legal 
definitions of abuse of patent are quite specific:
1. Non-working on a commercial scale or to an adequate extent (within a 3 or 4 year period 
of filing the patent application or certification of the patent) and there is no satisfactory 
reason for such non-working (sub-sec. (2)(a)).  The requirement of working to "an 
adequate extent" is somewhat imprecise, but does appear to cover supply limits which are 
deficient in terms of market demand.  
2. Demand for the product is not being met to an adequate extent and on reasonable terms
(sub-sec. (2)(c)).  The statute appears to require the demand to be an actual not merely 
anticipatory.  In South Africa, there is no doubt that the true demand for AIDS medicines 
is not being met primarily as a result of high prices for medicines.  Thus, the question 
becomes whether the "reasonable terms" provision includes price. Fortunately, there 
appears to be little doubt that the phrase "reasonable terms" refers primarily to the price 
charged.  James Lomax Cathro's Applications (1934) 51 RPC 75 @ 82. Even though 
drug companies have dramatically lowered prices, frequently by as much as 85%, current 
conditional discount prices by pharmaceutical patent holders are still three or four times 
as expensive as the much cheaper generics offered by Cipla, Rambaxy, and Hetero of 
India.  Moreover, the price differentials are much sharper in the private sector where the 
drug companies continue to seek higher profits (private sector ARVs still cost over 
$2000/year in South Africa).  Thus, because of unreasonable pricing in the private sector 
and comparatively unreasonable pricing terms even in the public and NGO sectors, a 
strong case could be made for the issuance of a compulsory license under this subsection.
3. Refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms that prejudices an existing or emerging 
trade or industry and it is in the public interest to grant a license (sub-sec. (2)(d)).  This 
provision appears to be inapplicable to current access issues.107  If the provision were to 
106 The State itself may apply for compulsory licenses under the Patents Act Section 4 which permits the 
Minister of State to seek a voluntary license for the use of the patented product for public purposes and in 
default of such voluntary agreement for the Minister to filed application to the Commissioner of Patents for 
an involuntary use (compulsory license) on terms or conditions to be set by the Commissioner.  Section 78, 
permits the government to go even further and to "acquire" any invention or patent.  Under the 
Constitution, the government could also "take" the patent and pay just compensation.
107 In the only reported case to date, the Supreme Court of Appeal denied an application for a compulsory 
license. Syntheta (Pty) Ltd v Janssen Pharmaceutica NV & Another 1999(1) SA 85 SCA. The Appellant 
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be adopted to include an essential facilities doctrine, like that contained in the 
competition scheme described below, this provision would be much more helpful.  In 
general it would be highly desirable for a patent scheme to include a refusal to deal 
provision.108
4. Demand is being met by importation and the price is excessive in relation to the price 
charged in the countries where the patented article is manufactured (sub-sec. (2)(e)).  
Since most pharmaceutical manufacturing is done in the U.S. and in rich European 
countries where prices are high, there is no "unfavorable price discrimination” in South 
Africa on most drug prices compared to First World prices.  However, some patented 
medicines are more expensive in some developing countries than in the country of origin.  
In these limited circumstances, South Africa could issue a compulsory license.  (A more 
direct route with respect to differential pricing across countries, however, is parallel 
importation under the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No.101 of 1965, as 
amended).
In addition to the Patent Act, the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 provides remedies 
for anti-competitive practices and presumably permits the issuance of open compulsory licenses 
for anti-competitive pricing practices by the pharmaceutical industry.  Section 8 of the South 
African Competition Act prohibits dominant firms from engaging in excessive pricing, refusing 
access to an essential facility, and engaging in other exclusionary acts:
8. Abuse of dominance prohibited.  It is prohibited for a dominant firm109 to -
(a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers; 
(b) refuse to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is 
economically feasible to do so;
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph (d),110 if 
the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its technological, efficiency or 
other pro-competitive gain; …
based its case on two allegations of abuse of patent:  (1) the non-working of the patented invention in South 
Africa on a commercial scale, or to an adequate extent (section 56(2)(a)); and (2) the refusal of the patentee 
to grant a license on reasonable terms, being the Appellant's offer of 6% royalty on selling price (section 
56(2)(d)).  The Court found against the Appellant on both grounds because of an insufficiency of evidence. 
In relation to the subsection 2(d) ground, the court focused on the issue of public use and need. This focus 
represents a signal that 'public benefit' can be an important factor. 
The computation of royalties also vexed the Court. It relied on the English decision of Hoffmann-La 
Roche & Co AG's Patent (1973) RPC 601 in suggesting that computation of royalty should, at a minimum, 
take account of 3 elements, namely:  (1) the patentee's expenditure on research and development; (2) the 
patentee's expenditure on promotion; and (3) a servicing of the capital element to allow a reasonable return 
on the preceding two elements.
108
 There is European precedent for a refusal to license a key chemical intermediate for a drug effective 
against tuberculosis.  ICI & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm’n of the E.C., 1974 E.C.R. 223, 250 
(1974) (abstracted in Refusal by a Dominant Firm to Sell Raw Materials, 19 Antitrust Bull. 605-618 
(1974).  The U.K. has also permitted compulsory licensing when a patent owner has refused to grant a 
license on reasonable terms under section 48 of the Patents Act.  In a recent ECJ opinion, the court held 
that “refusal to grant a license to use protected intellectual property constitutes an abuse [under Section 82 
of E.U. competition law]” where the potential licensee has “the intention of producing goods and/or 
services with different characteristics.”  Ingrid Hering, ECJ opinion could lead to uncertainty, http://lists.
Essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2003-October/005412.html (Oct. 13, 2003).
109
 Section 7 states  “A firm is dominant in a market if –  (a) it has at least 45% of that market; (b) it has at 
least 35%, but less than 45%, of that market, unless it can show that it does not have market power; or (c) it 
has less than 35% of that market, but has market power.
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Section 1 provides key definitions:111
(viii) ‘essential facility’ means an infrastructure or resource that cannot reasonably be 
duplicated, and without access to which competitors cannot reasonably provide goods or 
services to their customers;
(ix) ‘excessive price’ means a price for a good or service which –
(aa) bears no reasonable relation to the economic value of that good or service; 
and
(bb) is higher than the value referred to in subparagraph (aa);
(x) ‘exclusionary act’ means an act that impedes or prevents a firm entering into, or 
expanding within, a market;
(xii) ‘goods or services’, when used with respect to particular goods or services, includes 
any other goods or services that are reasonably capable of being substituted for them, 
taking into account ordinary commercial practice and geographical, technical and 
temporal constraints;
In its recently announced decision, the South African Competition Commission supported three 
theories for issuing a pharmaceutical compulsory license.   Under the first theory, compulsory 
licenses should be granted whenever it can be shown that there is a gap between need for the 
medicine and its accessibility due to excessive pricing, in other words, whenever an “above 
110 (d) engage in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm concerned can show technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its act –
(i) requiring or inducing a supplier or customer to not deal with a competitor;
(ii) refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those goods is economically 
feasible;
(iii) selling goods or services on condition that the buyer purchases separate goods or services 
unrelated to the object of a contract, or forcing a buyer to accept a condition unrelated to the object 
of a contract;
(iv) selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost; or
(v) buying-up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a competitor.
111 Section 1 also provides guidance on interpretation of the Act:
(2) This Act must be interpreted –
(a) in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and gives effect to the purposes set 
out in section 2; and
(b) in compliance with the international law obligations of the Republic.
(3) Any person interpreting or applying this Act may consider appropriate foreign and 
international law.
Section 2 defines the purposes:
2. Purpose of Act
The purpose of this Act is to promote and maintain competition in the Republic in order –
(a) to promote the efficiency, adaptability and development of the economy;
(b) to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices;
(c) to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South 
Africans;
(d) to expand opportunities for South African participation in world markets and 
recognise the role of foreign competition in the Republic;
(e) to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and
(f) to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership 
stakes of historically disadvantaged persons.
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market value” or supra-competitive price contributes to the access gap.  The second theory 
involves the failure to grant voluntary licenses which can be considered exclusionary where the 
anti- competitive effect of non-licensing outweighs any “technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain.” Under the third access-to-an-essential-facility theory, a compulsory license 
should be issued whenever a patent holder’s failure to grant voluntary licenses denies consumer 
access to a competitor’s product.  This theory has particular salience with respect to downstream 
innovation, such as fixed-dose combination drugs.  Just as dominant firms are prohibited from 
charging excess prices that limit access, they are prohibited from engaging in exclusionary acts 
such as refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying them is economically 
feasible.  This essential facilities/refusal to deal rule applies most strongly where a generic 
company is seeking a license to make a fixed-dose combination of medicines patented by several 
different companies.  
Although a price discrimination theory was not directly adopted by the Competition Commission, 
a dominant firm may be found guilty of prohibited price discrimination if the firm discriminates 
between purchasers in the price charged. §§ 9(1)(b) & 9 (c)(ii).  At present, pharmaceutical 
companies discriminate significantly between the public and private sectors in for antiretrovirals 
and other drugs.  Although some differences might be accounted for because of bulk purchase, 
clearly these discounts are not related solely to cost.  On the other hand, it is highly desirable that 
the public sector obtains deep price discounts and it would be an unconscionable outcome if 
companies reacted to the price discrimination issue by revoking public sector discounts.  Since 
the long-term public health mandate is for cheap medicines in both the public and private sector, 
it seems desirable to seek compulsory licenses on the basis of price discrimination while carefully 
balancing the risk of a backlash from the pharmaceutical companies.
4.2   Regulating voluntary licenses
Voluntary licensing agreements result from negotiations between patent holders and other 
entities. Ordinarily voluntary licensing agreements allow third parties to use a patent holder’s 
patent to produce, market, or otherwise distribute the patented product normally in exchange for 
an unregulated royalty or licensing fee to the patent holder.  In addition to requiring agreed-upon 
compensation for licensing, the patent holder can ordinarily impose restrictions on the sale or 
transfer of the license and on the geographical distribution and marketing of the affected 
product.112  Finally, the patent holder can limit the duration of agreement and can even make it 
terminable at will or revocable on certain conditions.  When voluntary licenses are unregulated, 
pharmaceutical companies can enforce terms on the amount of compensation, permitted usages, 
and distribution, especially export.  
To counterbalance the risk of anti-competitive outcomes in voluntary licenses mandated by 
compulsory licensing schemes, developing countries could choose to regulate the following pro-
competitive/commercially reasonable terms of voluntary licenses:  (a) expansion of geographical 
scope and explicit options for export within a Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement authorized 
regional trade group, (b) prohibition of sector limitations (no public sector or NGO-only sector 
clauses), (c) non-exclusivity, (d) direct permission to produce fixed-dose combination medicines, 
(d) requirements of some degree of technology transfer and/or manufacturing know-how, (e) 
access to confidential test data for purposes of establishing bio-equivalence and equal bio-
availability, and (f) public disclosure of royalty rates negotiated within a range of reasonableness.  
112
 Michael A. Friedman, Henk den Besten, Amir Attaran, Out-licensing: A practical approach for 
improvement of access to medicines in poor countries, 361 Lancet 341-44 (2003).
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This kind of regulation of voluntary licenses to prevent anti-competitive practices is directly 
authorized by Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement.113
1.  Geographical restrictions.  For voluntary licenses to be of any real use in increasing 
access to high quality, affordable medicines, the licensee has to be able to achieve 
economies-of-scale sufficient to justify investment in human and physical capacity.  For a 
few countries and for a few drugs, the internal market may be sufficiently large and/or 
rich to justify investment by the licensee and to achieve meaningful economies-of-scale.  
However, for many smaller economies and/or economies with severely limited 
purchasing power, efficient economies-of-scale can only be achieved by means of 
regional markets.  As a general proposition, therefore, voluntary licenses should not be 
unduly burdened with unrealistic geographical restrictions.  In this context, permitting 
licenses for distribution throughout Africa would certainly make some sense, both to 
countries with and without patents in place.  Likewise, an even broader distribution to all 
"developing" countries might also make sense.114
Another reason to have few geographical restrictions with respect to voluntary licenses is 
the issue of non-exclusivity.  Ordinarily, it will not be desirable to give a voluntary 
license to one producer only.  Of course, there is a complex balancing act to figure out 
how many licenses can exist within a given national or regional market before the 
number of licenses begins to create disincentives to entrepreneurial investment in 
capacity.  On the other hand, recent research indicates that prices go down dramatically, 
in the absence of price controls, only when a certain number of generic competitors enter 
the market.  Rather than reproduce a small number of generic monopolists, each with its 
own individual market concentration, it would be better, as a matter of policy, to open up 
the geographical scope of a license to permit competition between licensees, each of 
whom could achieve economies-of-scale but still be subject to stiff competition in any 
given market.  An alternative route to affordability would be voluntary price control 
terms in the license itself.  However, these price-ceiling agreements might raise some 
competition concerns in some countries though price maintenance/fixing concerns are 
usually a problem with respect to price floor, not price ceilings.
Despite urging few geographical restrictions with respect to developing country markets, 
it might be appropriate to permit patent holders to impose geographical restrictions with 
respect to developed country markets.  In this regard, and into the foreseeable future, the 
industry is going to be able to affect national legislation in developed economies to 
prohibit parallel importation from developing countries where the industry has offered 
discount prices or where it has issued voluntary licenses.  However, with a geographical 
limitation, there will be a contractually enforceable patent bar in developed countries as 
well.  In this regard, the industry might well be concerned about allowing contractual 
sanctions for improper diversion of licensed drugs to developed economies.  However, as 
113
 This right is subject to a process of consultation between affected Members with respect to anti-
competitive licensing agreements.
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 Some might wonder if a country has sovereign authority to require a patent-holder to relinquish patent 
rights in another country in order to prevent the issuance of a compulsory license in the subject state.  
Although countries might not be able regulate truly voluntary license in this way, the voluntary licenses in 
this instance are part of a compulsory licensing scheme wherein a nation has a sovereign interest in 
increasing access to medicines to address a valid public health concern.  In these special regulatory 
circumstances, it seem appropriate to regulate geographical restrictions so that generic producers can reach 
efficient economies-of-scale and thus sell medicines even more cheaply.
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long as national exhaustion (U.S.) and regional exhaustion (E.U.) are the only options 
within developed countries, the prospects of product diversion and gray markets is 
greatly reduced.  Even so, a given company could impose some reasonable sanction on 
intentional breaches of geographical limitations by a license holder.  These sanctions 
could range all the way from multiple royalties to eventual termination of the license for 
repeated bad faith breaches.
2.  Market segmentation.  Market segmentation, e.g., public vs. private, is problematic 
especially in developing countries.  At present, major pharmaceutical companies have 
made a decision to seek profits off the small elite populations within developing markets, 
even at the cost of unaffordability for the vast majority of people infected with diseases 
such as AIDS.  However, a generic licensee is going to want some access to private 
sector buyers with money to spend, rather than bet solely on uncertain public 
expenditures by poor countries or evaporating donor support for the Global Fund.  It may 
be galling to proprietary companies that even small rich "profit centers" will be lost, but 
if they really want to contribute to the global treatment, they will have to bite the bullet 
and give up on public/private sector differentiation.  
One problem with trying to maintain a private sector/public sector market differentiation 
is that it will become virtually impossible to secure distribution channels so as to prevent 
theft, corruption, and diversion to the more lucrative private market, undercutting the 
marketing advantage there anyway.  Similarly, even in the private sector, most Africa 
developing country consumers cannot afford moderately discounted ARVs.  Thus, if 
there are large price differentials between medicines in the private and public sector, an 
additional effect of high prices in the private sector might be disruptive migration of more 
affluent HIV-positive consumers to the already overburdened public sector.  Accordingly, 
if developing countries want to get the maximum treatment to the most people at the 
lowest cost and if they want to avoid disruption of the public sector by migration from the 
private sector, drug companies will have to give up their goal of market segmentation.
Despite arguing for basic price parity between the public and private sector, it might be 
possible to have some slight differences in royalty payments due based on defensible 
market segments, e.g., 5% vs. 10% royalties.  The problem would be to avoid pricing 
differentials that would prompt the disruptions described above.
3.  Non-exclusivity.  The general principle for compulsory licenses should be non-
exclusivity, meaning that multiple licenses should be issued.  To the extent that 
regulation of voluntary licenses is motivated by a desire to enhance competition, 
regulators would want to disrupt the more normal practice of simply transferring the 
monopoly.  Therefore, there are arguments that the best practice might be the issuance of 
open licenses.  However, too many entrants can also deter investment and entry by a 
particular licensee.  Canada is the country that has had the greatest experience in issuing 
compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical products and it granted an average of three 
licenses per drug, with a variance of one to eleven.115  The WHO, in its procurement 
practices tries to ensure the presence of at least five competitors.  Especially if licenses 
have no geographical limits and no market restrictions, more competitors can be licensed.
4.  Cross-licensing for fixed-dose combinations.  Clearly the licenses should permit 
freedom to research and cross-license fixed-dose combination medicines and other 
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 F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Drug Patent Licensing, 9, World Bank June 24-25 (May 2003).
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therapeutic advances.  One of the greatest irrationalities in the current patent regime is 
that it creates disincentives for patent holders to develop rational drug combination 
therapies with their competitors.  In the long run, this will become one of the main 
rationales for the issuance of compulsory licenses.  Therefore, in the interest of 
promoting public health and of maximizing treatment compliance, the license should 
certainly permit, indeed promote, cross-licensing and combination of products.  
5.  Manufacturing know-how and technology transfer.  To make voluntary licenses 
work and to avoid risks of poor quality drugs, the companies should be required to assist 
in technology transfer.  AIDS medicines in particular are complicated medicines needing 
special care in quality control to ensure bio-availability in a narrow range.  Accordingly, 
licensees should not have to reinvent the wheel; they should get the very best assistance 
possible for transfer of technology and expertise.  In this regard, voluntary licensors 
should specifically be required to transfer manufacturing know-how as well as essential 
technologies.  In the event of trade secrets, the drug company can require confidentiality.
6.  Registration data.  The voluntary license should include access to and/or comparison 
against otherwise confidential data submitted to a drug registration authority to secure 
market approval.  The voluntary licensee should not have to conduct independent clinical 
studies, but instead should be expressly permitted to establish bio-equivalence and equal 
bio-availability.  In the special case of fixed-dose combinations, where a combined 
product registration dossier has not previously been filed, patent holders should have 
even greater obligations to permit access to underlying data so that fixed-dose 
combination registration can be eased.
7.  Duration.  The time line on voluntary licenses should be long, with a presumption of 
renewability except for cause, so that generic manufacturers can estimate their market 
and invest in productive capacity.  Many newer medicines are hard to produce.  High 
quality pharmaceutical capacity is expensive and time-consuming to build.  Thus, the 
time horizon must be long enough to secure investment under conditions of uncertainty.
8.  Royalty rates.  The regulation of voluntary licenses should include some attempt to 
limit royalty rates.  Relatively small royalties in the range of 2-10% have become 
traditional in the pharmaceutical field.  Setting rates in this general range could be done 
by means of legislative findings about a presumptive permissible range.  This range could 
be further calibrated by reference to the list of factors that might sensibly affect royalties 
including public expenditures, inventiveness, research and development costs, remaining 
life of the patent, and purpose of use.  
5.  POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF GLOBAL FUND AND U.S. PROCUREMENT RULES
Because of fiscal constraints, many developing countries will rely on donor funding for 
purchasing important on-patent medicines, including antiretrovirals and combination anti-malaria 
medicines containing Artemisinin.  These funding sources will in turn often prescribe 
procurement policies for grant recipients.  Some of these requirements may impact sourcing 
decisions, including the decision whether to import medicines from abroad or to produce them 
domestically.  Generally these procurement policies address questions of price, quality, and 
intellectual property legality.
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5.1   Global Fund policies
C. PROCUREMENT AND PRICING
7. Procurement practices
The Fund will require that, as a minimum, Recipient procurement offices and any contracted 
agencies/services adhere to the Interagency Operational Principles for Good Pharmaceutical 
Procurement.116  Where practices differ from the Interagency Guidelines, Recipients or their 
agents must demonstrate to the LFA comparable systems for competitive bidding within a group 
of pre-qualified suppliers, transparency and accountability to their practices, and their application 
of necessary quality assurance mechanisms.  Recipients should also demonstrate the existence 
of a full set of contractual documentation to govern each transaction.
8. Procurement responsibilities
a) The Recipient is responsible for all procurement, with the use of contracted local, regional or 
international procurement agents being at the discretion of the Recipient.  The exception to 
this would be for those product categories for which local procurement capacity is insufficient, 
as judged by the Procurement and Supply Management Assessment.  For such product 
categories, Recipients would be required to use established regional or international 
procurement services and will be informed by the Fund on which mechanisms are available.  
b) Even for product categories for which Recipients have procurement capacity, the use of 
capable regional and global procurement services is encouraged wherever pooling of 
demand lowers prices for products of assured quality.  
9. Monitoring supplier performance
Recipients are responsible for monitoring the performance of suppliers with respect to product 
and service quality and for submitting that information electronically for web publication through a 
mechanism established by or identified by the Fund.  Reporting guidelines for supplier 
performance should be specified by the LFA, according to guidelines provided by the Secretariat 
of the Fund.
10. Lowest possible price
a) The Fund requests Recipients to use Good Procurement Practices, which includes 
competitive purchasing from qualified manufacturers and suppliers, as outlined in section B of 
these recommendations, to attain the lowest price of products. The Fund encourages 
Recipients to comply with national laws and applicable international obligations in the field of 
intellectual property including the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS agreement and referred to 
in the Doha declaration in a manner that achieves the lowest possible price for products of 
assured quality. 
b) The Fund encourages the voluntary efforts of pharmaceutical companies to expand current 
tiered or preferential pricing arrangements, among other mechanisms, to promote differential 
pricing.
c) Disclosure of information on prices paid for purchases by Fund Recipients is a matter of 
principle and will facilitate a process leading to lower prices.  The Fund will ensure that 
information on prices paid on products of assured quality with the same conditions (e.g., 
including other goods or services included in the contract) is made publicly available.  The 
disclosure of this information will be pursued by the Fund.  A methodology for assuring this 
transparency will be presented to the Board by January 2003.
d) In the cases of this policy, price refers to DDU costs – delivered duty unpaid.  The approach 
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taken may be to publicly list average, minimum,  maximum, and mode prices and/or prices for 
individual companies and/or Recipients. This choice requires further consideration by the 
Fund to identify or develop standard methods to ensure to the extent possible that price 
information is based on a consistent set of definitions.  It is understood that price 
comparisons are indicative and must include special “add ons”/conditions included in the 
price and that actual prices will vary. 
E. BUDGETING AND FINANCE
17. Direct payment to suppliers upon delivery
Prompt payment in compliance with the terms of payment of the contractual provisions 
encourages timely delivery of products and reduces transaction costs.  Direct payment to 
suppliers by the Trustee, on confirmation of delivery, will be allowable upon request of the 
Secretariat if, as confirmed by the LFA, such payment arrangements are expected to reduce 
costs and to be consistent with necessary accounting requirements.
18. Exemption from duties, tariffs and taxes
a) The Fund strongly encourages the relevant national authorities in the Primary Recipient’s 
country to exempt from duties and taxes all public health products financed by the Fund to 
NGOs, groups of NGOs, or national authorities, or any other PRs.  
b) In any case, Fund resources may not be used to pay duties, tariffs, local or national taxes on 
public health products procured with Fund resources.  If payment of such fees is required by 
relevant national authorities, such payment is the responsibility of the Recipient.
19. Additionality of Fund resources and contribution to sustainability
a) The Fund encourages Recipients to manage and to apply Fund resources as part of a 
sustainable long-term plan for local public health financing.  Recipients will be required to 
declare in the original proposal to the Fund other international financing and product donation 
programs being utilized by Recipients.  Ongoing indicators must show the magnitude of 
product financing supported by domestic versus international financing.  
b) Programs which include consumer cost recovery mechanisms are eligible for funding by the 
Fund when such programs are part of a pre-existing healthcare financing policy, which should 
be specified in the proposal to the Fund; in these cases, the budget request to the Fund must 
not duplicate costs to be reimbursed by consumers.
21. Prices used for budgeting proposals
a) For budget requests for pharmaceutical products, proposals to the Fund must use the lessor 
of current procurement prices, firm offers from suppliers, or existing public price information 
sources specified by the Secretariat in the Guidelines for Proposals.  A rationale for 
budgeting using prices other than those specified above should be described in the proposal.  
All prices should be expressed in standard trade terminology to allow transparent 
comparison.  
b) During implementation, these budgeted prices will not act as a defined reimbursable ceiling 
or floor to the full cost of products paid by the Recipient, provided that products are of 
assured quality and that procurement practices adhere to the policies of the Recipient and 
Fund.
 (GF/B4/2)
The Global Fund has adopted a lowest cost, pricing requirement.117  In general, this means that 
grant recipients will be obligated to procure the lowest cost medicine that meets other standards 
117 See generally, Health Action International, Assured quality and lowest price:  What the Global Fund 
requires for buying medicines (Sept. 2003).
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concerning quality and legality.118  The Board of the Global Fund considered the possibility of 
permitting a premium for domestically produced products.119  This preference would have been 
consistent with the policy of the World Bank, which provides for a 10-15% domestic preference 
margin to local manufacturers on government tenders.120  However, the Board rejected adopting a 
domestic preference mark-up even where the government is the purchasing entity.121
Accordingly, whenever patented antiretrovirals or other drugs can be lawfully sourced more 
cheaply from international producers, the recipient will be required to utilize that source of 
supply.  As an example of the stringency of this requirement, the Global Fund requires that “all 
procurement of medications for Multi-Drug Resistant TB (tuberculosis) must be conducted 
through the Green Light Committee.”122  The Green Light Committee also serves an important 
function as the means by which the correct treatment of MDR-TB is assured as much as is 
possible through the dissemination of information and the review of existing TB treatment 
programs. The treatment of MDR-TB can be extremely complex. One of the concerns is that 
without a strong, existing DOTS program to oversee administration of the DOTS-Plus protocols, 
there is a risk of creating even stronger strains of MDR-TB, resistant to even the second and third 
line treatments.
B. QUALITY ASSURANCE
4. Compliance with quality standards
a) For any medicinal product to be eligible for purchase with Fund resources, its compliance 
with quality standards must be assured.  For multi-source, off-patent products with available 
dosage from public pharmacopoeial quality standards, verification of product compliance with 
standards would be conducted in accordance with the existing national procedures of the 
Recipient’s country.  
b) Provided products are accepted by the national drug regulatory agency (NDRA) of the 
Recipient country (see 5 below), to be eligible for purchase with Fund resources any single or 
limited source product (that is, a medicinal product for which there are not publicly available 
quality assurance standards, analytic methods, and reference standards) must (a) have been 
found to be acceptable by the WHO-initiated UN Pilot Procurement Quality and Sourcing 
Project, or (b) have been authorized for consumption in its country by a stringent regulatory 
authority,123 or (c) have been authorized by the national drug regulatory authority in the 
Recipient’s country.  Option (c) is applicable only until December 31, 2004, after which 
suppliers must comply with one of the two standards as set out in (a) and (b) – and in all 
cases are subject to monitoring product quality standards prescribed by the Fund as in 6.1.
5. National drug registration
118 See, generally, Report of the Third Board Meeting, 10-11 October 2002, GF/B4/2; Report of the Fourth 
Board Meeting, 29-31 January 2003, GF/B5/2; Guidelines for Proposals, The Global Fund, March 2003; 
Report of the Portfolio Management and Procurement Committee to the 5th Board Meeting, GF/B5/9.  Of 
course, the basic procurement price is only part of the total cost of procuring and delivering the medicine to 
end-users.  Other elements can add significantly to actual costs:  freight/shipping, insurance, registration, 
quality assurance, storage, internal transportation, dispensing, administration, distribution costs charged by 
intermediaries, duties, tariffs, and national and local taxes.
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 Report of the Portfolio Management and Procurement Committee, GF/B4/7 (Fourth Board Meeting, 
Geneva, 29-31 January 2003).  Although the PMC recommended up to a 15% price premium, this 
recommendation was no adopted, meaning that recipients must continue to source at lowest cost.
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 World Bank Group, Bidding for Goods and Works Contracts, <http://www.worldbank.org.ru/eng/
constant/answer4.html> (2003).
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 See Report of the Fourth Board Meeting, supra note 120. 
122 See Green Light Committee <http://www.who.int.gtb/policyrd/DOTSplus.htm> .
123
 For the purposes of this policy a stringent drug regulatory authority is defined as a regulatory authority 
in one of the 28 countries which is either a PIC/S and/or ICH member
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a) Products procured with Fund resources are subject to authorization by the National Drug 
Regulatory Authority (NDRA) in the country in which they will be used, following its standard 
practices for drug registration for pharmaceutical products.  For products that have passed 
the UN Pilot Procurement Quality and Sourcing Project review, as described in above, 
NDRAs are encouraged to expedite registration by accepting WHO pre-qualification 
inspection and supporting dossiers in lieu of national requirements.  
b) For products which have been authorized by stringent drug regulatory authorities, NDRAs are 
encouraged to expedite registration by accepting in lieu of national requirements the 
Executive Summary of the Common Technical Document (CTD) or Summary parts for 
quality, safety and efficacy together with all necessary information to perform quality control 
testing of products and necessary reference standards.
6. Monitoring product quality 
a) Recipients, their procurement agents, or NDRA’s must systematically draw random samples 
of pharmaceutical products purchased with Fund resources for quality control testing to 
monitor compliance with quality standards.  Testing may be budgeted in proposals, to be 
funded by the Fund.  For multi-source off-patent products with available public standards, 
samples should be sent to WHO-recognized laboratories in cases where the NDRA have no 
capacity for this testing.  
b) For single- or limited-source products without public standards and pre-qualified by UN Pilot 
Procurement Quality and Sourcing Project, samples should be sent to WHO-recognized 
laboratories already participating in the WHO pre-qualification project in case the NDRA has 
no capacity.  For single- or limited-source products that have been pre-qualified on the basis 
of authorization by a regulatory authority in an ICH and/or PIC/S member, testing shall be 
done by a laboratory identified by the purchaser as stated in the purchase contract.  The 
laboratory should be a WHO-recognized laboratory, or a laboratory in ICH and/or PIC/S 
countries in case the country does not have identified laboratory capacity.
(GF/B4/2)
Decision 4:  (Sixth Board Meeting)124
National Drug Regulatory Authorities (NDRA) laboratories or laboratories recognized by the 
NDRA should be used for quality monitoring by the PR (principal recipient).  To ensure the 
respective laboratories have adequate capacity for full pharmacopoeial testing, they must meet 
one of the following criteria:  acceptance for collaboration with WHO pre-qualification project; 
accredited in accordance with ISO17025 and/or EN45002; accepted by a stringent authority.
Because poor quality medicines can have serious health and financial consequence, the Global 
Fund has adopted exacting quality standards during both the production and distribution process.  
If medicines do not contain the correct active ingredients in correct quantities, if quality and 
efficacy deteriorate because of improper handling or expiration, or if medicines contain harmful 
substances, patients will be exposed to substandard or even dangerous therapies that can lead to 
treatment failure, drug resistance, and even death.  Accordingly, the Global Fund requires that 
pharmaceutical products procured with Fund resources be authorized by the relevant national 
drug regulatory authority (NDRA) in the country in which they will be used and that agency is 
instructed to follow its standard practices for drug registration of pharmaceutical products.  
However, the Global Fund is not content to rely on unreliable national safety certifications; thus it 
will require a separate quality assurance guarantee starting in 2005.  At that time, pharmaceuticals 
124 See The Portfolio Management and Procurement Committee recommendation at the Sixth Board 
Meeting, Chiang Mai, 15-17 October 2003, GF/B6/9.
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will have to be pre-approved by the U.N. Pilot Procurement Quality and Sourcing Project125
[WHO pre-qualification project] or be accepted for use in a country with a stringent NDRA.  This 
is a far-reaching requirement that will dramatically affect countries’ decisions to support local 
production.  Unless they can buy, AIDS, TB, and malaria medicines on their own, they will be 
required to have their domestic supplier go through the WHO pre-qualification process, a 
rigorous process that has already proved onerous and time-consuming for some experienced 
Indian producers.  This process is particularly fraught with respect to fixed-dose combination 
ARVs where there is no pre-existing registration portfolio.
On the other hand, the Global Fund is also interested in speeding up the in-country registration of 
medicines that have been pre-qualified by the WHO or by a stringent registration authority.  As 
an aid to fast-track approval of essential medicines, the Fund urges expedited approval for 
products that have been accepted by the WHO pre-qualification project or authorized by a 
stringent NDRA, one that is a member of the Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention/Scheme 
and/or the International Conference of Harmonisation.126
Since quality can deteriorate during distribution, the Global Fund also requires rigorous quality 
control testing thorough various stages of the supply chain from manufacture to final 
consumption.  This testing too will need to be performed by a high-quality lab.
The WHO has just released a study documenting the growing problem of substandard and 
counterfeit medicines estimating that up to 25% of medicines consumed in poor countries are 
deficient and that the deficiencies are particularly problematic for high-markup products treating 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.127   “Trade in substandard and counterfeit medicines is 
most prevalent in countries with weak drug regulation control and enforcement, scarcity and/or 
erratic supply of basic medicines, unregulated markets and unaffordable prices,” according to the 
WHO press release.  The risk of counterfeit medicines also rise “[w]hen prices of medicines are 
high and price differentials between identical products exist,” inducing some consumers to seek 
medicines outside of the normal supply system.  This finding highlights one of the dangers of 
market segmentation whereby drug companies seek to maintain higher profit margins in private 
sector sales at the same time that discount prices are available in the public or NGO sector.  To 
redress these recurrent problems, the WHO recommends legislative reform to strengthen 
enforcement powers in drug regulatory authorities, strategies to reduce corruption and criminal 
activity, and international cooperation like its own pre-qualification program for HIVAIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria medicines.
The net impact of the Global Fund’s concerns about quality, bolstered by the recent WHO report, 
is that developing countries will need to be quite strict about quality issues both for imported and 
domestically produced drugs.  Absent the Global Fund rule, there had been some concern that 
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 WHO pre-qualification will not replace the requirement of in-country registration, but it should help fill 
a capacity gap in low-income countries that have difficulty independently assessing quality of medicines 
and manufacturers’ adherence to Good Manufacturing Practice.  The frequently updated list of pre-
qualified medicines is not binding on governments, but it does provide evidence-based quality assessments 
of manufacturers and of key medicines.  See <http://www.who.int/medicines/organization/gsm/activities/
pilotproc/pilotprocmain.shtml>.
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 The ICH brings together the regulatory authorities from the United States, the European Union and 
Japan.  See <http://www.ich.org>.   The IPC/S is comprised of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, 
Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom. See <http://www.picscheme.org/overview/picsauth.htm>. 
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developing countries with weak NDRA’s might be tempted to cut corners to register substandard 
domestically produced medicines.  Obviously this would be disastrous for the long-term control 
of infectious diseases and for treatment of chronic conditions; moreover, it would waste scarce 
fiscal resources.  In sum, developing countries should be concerned about the quality of 
medicines not only price or country of origin.  The required Global Fund standard is lowest price 
for drugs of assured quality – both sides of the equation are important.
Global Fund – IP issues
“[I]n making its funding decisions, the Fund will support proposals which … [a]re consistent with 
international law and agreements, respect intellectual property rights, such as TRIPS, and 
encourage efforts to make quality drugs and products available at the lowest possible prices for 
those in need.”  (Framework Document, GFATM/B1/doc 4.)
“The Fund encourages recipients to comply with national laws and applicable international 
obligations in the field of intellectual property, including the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS … 
agreement and referred to in the Doha declaration, in a manner that achieves the lowest possible 
price for products of assured quality.” (GF/B4/2)
The Global Fund “encourages” countries to procure products that are legal under national and 
international law, but it has not undertaken a close review of recipients’ decisions in this regard.  
The Global Fund takes special pains to emphasize the use of flexibilities within the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Doha Declaration.  (Given the adoption of the Paragraph 6 Implementation 
Agreement, its flexibilities should also now be considered.)  At a minimum these flexibilities 
including sourcing from no-patent countries, parallel importation, non-predominate export 
pursuant to a “normal” compulsory license, and export pursuant to a “special” paragraph 6 
compulsory license.  However, there is also room for countries to source from countries using an 
Article 30 limited exception to patent rights.  This option was not explicitly endorsed at the WTO, 
but neither was it specifically rebuffed.  
A second and important feature of the Global Fund IP rule is that recipients are encouraged to use 
flexibilities “in a manner that achieves the lowest possible price.”  This requirement is designed 
to prevent “gaming” by developing countries with respect to their sourcing choices.  For example, 
some countries might be tempted to issue compulsory licenses for local production even where 
that production will be uneconomical with respect to the global market, where the lowest price for 
fixed-dose combination ARVs is now below $140/year.  Although a country would certainly be 
able to preferentially source local products drawing from its own fiscal reserves, in using Global 
Fund money it is obligated to import cheapest medicines from abroad whether generic or 
proprietary.  As a practical matter, this “lowest-cost” requirement, in conjunction with the 
intellectual-property-legality standard, requires developing countries to issue compulsory licenses 
open to both local production and importation so that they might eventually choose the most cost 
effective alternative.
At present, it is unclear whether Global Fund rules can be bent to permit developing countries to 
pay a domestic-production premium out of their own funds (lowest cost price reimbursed by the 
Global Fund, domestic premium paid by the recipient).128  In the long run, however, this choice is 
128
 This option, even if it exists, would be subject the Global Fund’s principle of additionality, which 
requires countries to maintain or expand current fiscal commitments to the health sector.  Thus, countries 
would at the very least have to appropriate additional funds to pay the price differential.
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terribly inefficient as it wastes scarce resources on commodity purchases that could more wisely 
be spent on health care infrastructure and systems and enhanced salaries for health care workers.
3.2 U.S. EPAR policies
The U.S. has been less than forthcoming about its planned procurement policies for its 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.  Given the historic alignment of U.S. policy and that of the 
pharmaceutical industry, however, it seems likely that U.S. purchasing decisions will be slanted 
toward purchases of price-discounted, patented medicines.  Evidence for this preference comes 
from direct statements by certain administration officials who downplay the likelihood of generic 
purchases and instead tout the benefits of buying “American” and buying drugs of “highest” 
quality.129  In addition, USAID procurement policy has long favored purchase of U.S. products 
with U.S. donor funds, even when such procurement is not cost-competitive.  
On the other hand, President Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address referred specifically to 
AIDS drugs costing only $300/year.  Since costs that low were only seen in the generic sector, the 
President’s statement seemed to be an indirect endorsement of generic purchases (or a not-too-
subtle message to major drug companies to drop their prices even further to be cost-competitive).  
The President’s implicit endorsement was subsequently confirmed by some administration 
officials who essentially said that the U.S. would permit purchase of generic drugs as long as the 
purchases were TRIPS compliant and permitted by national law.  In this regard, one could 
certainly expect that U.S. trade lawyers will be scrutinizing sourcing decisions more rigorously 
than the Global Fund does, but it remains possible that the U.S. will indeed permit developing 
countries to source generic medicines at low cost whether produced domestically or 
internationally as long as all relevant intellectual property rules have been scrupulously followed.
6.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENT GENERIC MANUFACTURE AND THE 
IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIES-OF-SCALE
As discussed previously, developing countries have important incentives to develop their own 
indigenous capacity to manufacture pharmaceutical products.  They can do so by encouraging a 
wide variety of entities ranging from purely domestic companies to subsidiaries of multinational 
companies that site a relatively large facility within the country.  Similarly, they can encourage 
local production that covers a wide range of productive activity varying from producers with 
innovative and manufacturing capacities of both active pharmaceutical ingredients and final 
formulations to producers that merely package already formulated medicines.130  Developing 
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 Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease is reported as 
saying that there will not likely be any “direct purchase” of generic drugs.  “It’s likely we will try to get the 
best possible price from drug companies … for ‘classic drugs,’ where the efficacy is proven and the quality 
we are sure of.”  He nonetheless acknowledged that there might still be an opening for indirect purchases 
by local programs that buy generics directly through lawful sources.  Sabin Russell, AIDS relief showcase 
of Bush’s Africa tour:  Critics wary of funding level, focus on abstinence, San Francisco Chronicle (July 7, 
2003).  Attacking the quality of generics has been a long-term strategy of PhRMA, which has used the 
twin-icons of piracy and substandard-quality to demonize the generic industry.
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 The typology established by UNIDO (1980) differentiated production based on differences in the source 
of the finished product:  (1) packaging of already formulated medicines and perhaps small-scale local 
production of formulations such as IV fluids; (2) formulation of drugs in final dosage form and perhaps 
some production from imported intermediates; (3) production from imported intermediates and 
manufacture of other intermediates from local materials, and (4) production of active substances and 
processing to produce the required dosage forms.  An alternative typology differentiates (1) integrated
corporations engaged in all stages of production and capable or generating new molecular entities for 
distribution through subsidiaries and licenses, (2) innovative companies typically producing off-patent 
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countries can encourage this expanded capacity lawfully under TRIPS both by direct subsidy and 
by their own procurement preferences for pharmaceutical products manufactured locally.  
However, the allure of local production may blind some developing countries to its true cost.  
That cost may include decreased future flexibility to rely on Paragraph 6 Implementation 
Agreement importation options and the long-term payment of excessive prices for medicines that 
can be sourced much more cheaply from overseas.
In this regard, understanding the issue of economies-of-scale is vitally important.  The U.S. has 
long understood the issue of advantageous economies-of-scale for its own pharmaceutical 
industry:
The foundation of free trade embodied in the WTO system is the removal of conditions 
that lead to inefficiencies in global trade.  The WTO has long recognized the trade-
distorting nature of local content, import substitution, and local production requirements.  
We note that the non-discrimination clause of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement is 
built on this foundation.
Pharmaceuticals are among the best examples of products where these principles are true.  
Pharmaceuticals can be efficiently produced in a small number of locations and 
transported through international trade to markets needing those products.  Such 
efficiencies of production and distribution lead to lower prices and faster supply of 
products to meet demands, including those caused by public health emergencies.131
Although the U.S. was trying to valorize its own proprietary drug industry with this statement and 
although there is little evidence that U.S. pharmaceutical monopolists have ever reduced their 
prices because of manufacturing efficiencies, economies-of-scale are demonstrably important to 
generic industries as recognized by Canada in the EC-Canada pharmaceutical products case at the 
WTO.132
Smaller countries that … have generic industries [do] not have domestic markets 
sufficiently large to enable those industries to operate on an economic scale.  Those 
industries [have] to export in order to be able to manufacture in sufficient quantities to 
achieve economies-of-scale, so that domestic consumers [can] receive the benefits of 
cost-effect generic products.133
The efficiency concerns stated publicly by the U.S. and Canada confirm earlier studies that 
concluded that local production of pharmaceuticals did not make good sense for most developing 
countries because of diseconomies-of-scale and technological demands.  The few exceptions were 
countries like China, India, Brazil, Thailand, Egypt, Mexico, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Argentina 
medicines but capable of some innovation, and (3) reproductive firms that rely entirely on active 
pharmaceutical ingredients procured from others.  See, Warren Kaplan, “Local Production”:  Industrial 
Policy and Access to Medicines:  An Overview of Key Concepts, Issues, and Opportunities for Future 
Research, World Bank Meeting on the Role of Generics and Local Industry in Attaining the Millennium 
Development Goals in Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines (June 24, 2003).
The pharmaceutical manufacturing process, depending on the end product, includes chemical 
synthesis, fermentation, extraction of organic chemicals from vegetative sources or animal tissues, and 
formulation into dosage forms such as tablets, capsules, injectable solutions, ointments, etc. and packaging 
in bottles, blister packs, etc.  Id.
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that had large local markets and the ability to produce active pharmaceutical ingredients.134  That 
number may have grown to include other countries with productive capacity such as South 
Africa.  But, if the economic cost of creating local pharmaceutical capacity is excessive, if the 
quality of products is doubtful, or if the final pricing is not competitive with existing foreign 
generic manufacturers because of diseconomies-of-scale or otherwise, then “this ‘local 
production solution’ will be no solution at all.”135  Moreover, developing countries will have to be 
willing to take a hard look at other factors affecting competitiveness including:  a shortage of 
skilled labor; a weak financial sector; diminished flows of foreign direct investment; and other 
disadvantages facing smaller enterprises and smaller countries.136  They will also have to consider 
the economic viability of single-drug facilities, for example, those that might primarily or 
exclusively produce fixed-dose combination ARVs.
Based on empirical research, Kaplan and others have concluded that 
[T]here is a ‘critical mass’ of industrial and socioeconomic development and human and 
technical resources that must be reached before any ‘indigenous’ pharmaceutical industry 
can survive.  These include:
• GDP great than about $100 billion
• Population greater than about 100 million
• Sufficient numbers of the population enrolled in secondary and tertiary education
• Competitiveness index (UNIDO) grater than about 0.15
• A net position pharmaceutical balance of trade.137
These hesitancies about the economics of local production are compounded by additional 
concerns about quality assurance.  As discussed in subsection 5.1, the issue of quality assurance is 
not just of function of good manufacturing practice but also a function of quality control based on 
a functioning drug regulation and registration system, a functioning drug quality control 
laboratory, an efficient system for storing and transferring drugs, and an enforceable regime of 
drug legislation.138
Accordingly, there is considerable uncertainty about ability of smaller developing countries to 
achieve efficiencies in drug manufacture especially with respect to active ingredients and with 
respect to harder to formulate medicines.  Some experts believe that only regional economies-of-
scale can be achieved in sub-Saharan Africa and that South Africa is the only country with a 
reasonable chance to develop an African regional capacity.139  Other experts, and indeed some 
countries assisting local production, appear to believe that smaller finishing plants can be efficient 
in making formulations and in labeling and packaging drugs for local consumption.140  This 
debate is surely important to developing countries and they should investigate these issues very 
closely lest too many countries erroneously assume that each can become a major regional 
supplier.  And they should not lose sight of the importance of accessing standard quality, generic 
134
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140 See, e.g., Bill Haddad, Chairman/CEO, Biogenerics, Inc, Presentation, World Bank Meeting on the Role 
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medicines at lowest cost thereby speeding and easing the flow of treatment to poor people bearing 
an unbearable burden of disease.
Whatever sourcing decisions they make, developing countries should seek to reduce barriers to 
generic entry and to generic companies achieving economies-of-scale.  In order to invest in 
producing medicines efficiently, generic manufacturers need predictable markets, regulatory 
access, freedom from patent-infringement lawsuits, and relief from ancillary trade agreements 
that undermine their ability to sell standard-quality medicines cheaply.  They also need some
profit motivation.
7.  EMERGING NEGATIVE IMPACT OF BILATERAL AND PLURILATERAL FREE 
TRADE AGREEMENTS ON POST-DOHA AND POST-PARAGRAPH 6 FLEXIBILITIES.
It would be gratifying to report that developed countries suffered a secure setback in their battle 
for TRIPS-plus intellectual property protections via the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement and that developing country solidarity and multilateralism restrained 
U.S. unilateralism.  However, the persistence of the U.S. and other developed countries in 
pursuing the interests of their pharmaceutical industries has not yet ceased.  Thus, at the same 
time that developed countries, led by the U.S., were enacting a strategy of export containment in 
the WTO, the U.S. in particular was negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreement with 
greatly enhanced intellectual property protections.  
To this end, in the past year the U.S. has concluded negotiations with Chile and Singapore and is 
negotiating further bilateral agreements with Morocco, Thailand, the Dominican Republic, 
Panama, and Australia.  In addition, it is pursuing regional negotiations in Central America, the 
Andes, Southern Africa, and the entire Western Hemisphere.  In each of these negotiations, the 
U.S. is seeking to impose TRIPS-plus intellectual property protections that would dramatically 
undermine both the Doha Declaration and the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement.
For example, even in Africa, at the heart of the AIDS pandemic, the USTR is undertaking trade 
negotiations to transplant U.S.-style patent protections into the South African Customs Union.141
In order to meet “standards of protection similar to that found in U.S. law,” SACU nations would 
be required: 
141
 On November 4, 2002, United States Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick formally notified 
Congressional leaders of the Administration's intent to initiate negotiations for a free trade agreement with 
the nations of the South African Customs Union: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland. With respect to intellectual property rights, the negotiations would:
-- Seek to establish standards that reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in U.S. law 
and that build on the foundations established in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPs Agreement) and other international intellectual property agreements, 
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
-- Establish commitments for SACU countries to strengthen significantly their domestic 
enforcement procedures, such as by ensuring that government agencies may initiate criminal 
proceedings on their own initiative and seize suspected pirated and counterfeit goods, equipment 
used to make or transmit these goods, and documentary evidence. Seek to strengthen measures in 
SACU countries that provide for compensation of right holders for infringements of intellectual 
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USTR Resources, Letter from Robert Zoellick to Senator Byrd <http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/11/
2002-11-04-SACU-byrd.PDF> (Nov. 5, 2002).
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• to limit compulsory licenses to national emergencies, to governmental, non-commercial 
use, and to anti-competitive practices remedies only;
• to bar parallel trade;
• to extend patent monopolies for administrative delays;142
• to link drug registration rights to patent status;
• to enhance protections for clinical trial testing data by providing at least five years of data 
exclusivity, thereby precluding registration of medicines produced under compulsory 
licenses;
• to adopt criminal enforcement for patent violations, including improvidently granted 
compulsory licenses.  
In sum, the proposed negotiation objectives would completely eviscerate the Doha flexibilities, 
dramatically increase IP protection, and reduce trade in affordable generic medicines.  
More particularly, in the context of the production-for-export problem, the CAFTA, SACU, and 
FTAA negotiations could be even more disastrous. For example, in the FTAA, the U.S. is the 
presumed sponsor of a troubling bracketed provision that would explicitly prohibit compulsory 
licensing for export (8.64 (6) (b)).  In this regard, PhRMA has been very explicit that it is 
advocating this export ban in South Africa saying:  “The USG should seek to limit the scope of 
Government use authority to exclude the possibility of Government use for the purpose of export, 
or for sale to the general public.”143  Basically, PhRMA and the USTR, by limiting compulsory 
licenses to national emergency and public non-commercial use, seek to prevent exports.144
If this no-export ban were to be imposed on SACU nations, then South Africa would be 
prevented from being a supplier of standard quality generic medicines to other SACU nations or 
to the subcontinent as a whole.  If the ban were imposed on Brazil in FTAA negotiations, it too 
would be barred from becoming a regional supplier for generics in Latin America.  And if the ban 
is imposed on Thailand in its bilateral negotiations, Asia would lose an important regional 
supplier.  Since regional and international production-for-export of generic medicines is 
necessary for countries with little or no efficient manufacturing capacity, excluding one of the 
few technically competent Africa producers, all of the technically competent South America 
producers, and one of the more efficient Asia producers would be a huge blow to poor countries 
trying to import affordable generic medicines.  Thus, any effort by U.S. free trade negotiators to 
sabotage pro-public health interpretations of TRIPS that would otherwise145 permit the export of 
low-cost generic medicines is morally and legally unacceptable.  In this regard, there is a strong 
argument that the persistent effort by the U.S. to expand patent protections in the face of worst 
health crisis in the last six hundred years violates legal limits on U.S. trade policy146 and an even 
stronger argument that it violates international human rights norms.147
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To counteract this danger, developing countries should unite to adopt a collaborative position 
resisting any efforts to add TRIPS-plus measures to the intellectual property provisions of 
regional or bilateral trade agreements.  TRIPS, the Doha Declaration, and the Paragraph 6 
Implementation Agreement should be seen as creating an impenetrable ceiling for intellectual 
property protections, particularly in the pharmaceutical sector.  Only by uniting can developing 
countries resist being picked off one-by-one and region-by-region by U.S. trade negotiators.  
8.  THE SHORT-TERM MANDATE FOR AN ARTICLE 30 LIMITED EXCEPTION FOR 
ACCESS TO EXPORTED GENERICS AND A LONG-TERM MANDATE FOR EXPLORING 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT FOR MEDICINES.
A deep paradox of developed-countries’ trade policy and their persistent effort to maintain and 
expand the proprietary industry’s hegemony in developing country markets is that these markets, 
where the AIDS, TB, and malarial pandemics are at their worst, comprise so little of the global 
pharmaceutical market.  A frequent argument from the USTR and PhRMA is that intellectual 
property rights must be protected and even expanded to provide incentives for future research and 
development and that the interest of consumers in continued path-breaking medical discoveries is 
jeopardized if patent protections are not maintained worldwide.  To rebut this concern, one need 
only survey the current structure of the global drug market where the world pharmaceutical 
market (2000) was estimated at $406 billion dollars.  North America, the European Union, and 
Japan purchased 80% of that total, by dollar volume, and all of them have robust systems of 
patent protection which protect patent holders against generic competition.  On the other hand, all 
of Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the so-called developing world, combined for only 
12% of the global market in 2000 (despite having 80% of the world’s population).148  Sub-
Saharan Africa, the center of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, comprises a miniscule 1.3% of worldwide 
drug sales and the poor countries of Asia and the Indian subcontinent only add another 3.9%.  
Accordingly, pharmaceutical companies make the vast bulk of their profits on secure sales in rich 
countries that have strong protections for intellectual property rights.  Moreover, drug companies 
earn a very handsome rate of return, on their sales - 18.5% - which places them at the top of all 
U.S. industry groups, five times the all-industry average.  As a result, the largest U.S. 
pharmaceutical concerns earned nearly $37 billion dollars in 2001, even after deducting expenses 
for current research and development.  In sum, the pharmaceutical industry is remarkably 
profitable (and has been so for many years) and its ability to conduct future research and 
development is in no real jeopardy based on anything that happens to low-volume sales of some 
of its products in some developing countries facing compelling public health dilemmas.
However, even if the drug companies were not already making huge profits in rich countries, 
more than enough to fund future research and development, are they losing profits by preventing 
access to medicines in developing countries?  To the contrary, tens of millions of poor people are 
going without access to affordable patented medicines, and drug companies aren’t making a dime 
on those non-sales.   How exactly are drug companies being hurt if someone else makes generic 
provisions found in U.S. law, the U.S. Trade Representative is also directly violating Executive Order 
13155, 3 C.F.R. 268, supra note 38.
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drugs much more cheaply, sells them to customers previously priced out of the market, and then 
pays a royalty, even a small one, to the patent holder, as they must under existing compulsory 
license rules?  The worst that will happen to drug companies is that they might lose some highly 
profitable sales to a narrow spectrum of rich elites in developing countries if their market 
segmentation strategy fails. However, this is a small price to pay in order to dramatically increase 
access to life-saving medicines for the other 98% of the population in poor countries.  
Accordingly, PhRMA’s intellectual property fundamentalism in developing countries produces 
little real benefit to drug companies.
As a result of coordinated global campaigns and activists’ strategic focus on drug pricing and 
intellectual property barriers, the prices for antiretroviral therapy have plummeted in three and a 
half years from $10,439/year to $140.149  As a result of those same campaigns, generic producers 
are now empowered to produce fixed-dose combinations, endorsed by the World Health 
Organization, that permit patients to take one pill twice a day rather than two dozen at widely 
different times, thereby facilitating patient compliance and reducing drug resistance.  Prices have 
plummeted because people imagined and believed that lives in developing countries are worth 
saving and worth fighting for.  As a result, for the same amount of money that could buy branded 
and patented medicines for 20,000 rich people in Africa in 2000, the world can now buy generic 
ARVs for 2,000,000 Africans living with AIDS by 2005.  
When unified in the aftermath of the anthrax scare, developing countries succeeded in 
overpowering the U.S. and producing the Doha Declaration.  Now, they are letting the developed 
world juggernaut  to conditionalize recent advances to the point of rendering them difficult, if not 
impossible to enforce..  Not only should they have rejected the Chairperson’s draft statement, 
they should they have rejected the earlier Motta text as well.  It contained too many compromises 
of vital public health interests, too many substantive and procedural inefficiencies.  Developing 
countries would have done better to rely on the text of the Doha Declaration and the baseline 
flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement.  Then, willing generic producers could have exported under 
Article 30 of TRIPS (permitting limited exceptions to patent rights) to willing importers that have 
issued compulsory licenses.  People living with treatable diseases need a full-size, fully 
operational Doha Declaration, 
Accordingly, the final recommendation of this paper is that developing countries return to the 
bargaining table and undo the damage done by the Paragraph 6 Implementation Agreement and 
Chairperson’s Statement.  Instead of relying on a highly conditioned, limited, and procedurally 
burdensome Article 31(f) solution, developed countries should go back to the simplified approach 
they championed for so long and that was subsequently endorsed by the European Parliament, the 
WHO, and leading NGOs around the world – a limited exception under Article 30 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.
Article 30 Production-for-Export Exception
Under Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement and pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, 
manufacturing shall be allowed:  (1) if the pharmaceutical product is intended for export to a third 
country that has issued a compulsory license for that product, or where a patent is not in force, (2) 
if there is a request to that effect by the competent public health authorities of that third country 
arising from a specified public health needs, (3) if that third country certifies that it has 
insufficient current capacity in its pharmaceutical sector to manufacture the medicines efficiently, 
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and (4) if low-cost methods are utilized to differentiate the labeling and packaging of the product 
from the patented version.
Although this particular language may not be perfect, an Article 30 solution is vastly superior as 
an easy-to-use mechanism for getting assured quality generics to developing countries in need.  
Having been forced into a strategic retreat by U.S. intransigence, developing countries should not 
solemnize an ineffective mechanism that locks in patent holders’ prerogatives and lock outs the 
most cost-effective forms of generic production.
Tinkering with the TRIPS Agreement and trying to forestall even more draconian intellectual 
property protections affecting access to medicines may, in the long run, be an ineffective strategy.  
The TRIPS system was designed, fundamentally, to protect the interests of intellectual property 
industries in the Global North at the expense of consumers in the Global South.  That’s 
problematic enough when the product at stake is a form of entertainment or a fancy software 
package, but it is far more problematic when lives are at stake, as they are with respect to access 
to essential medicines.
Therefore, I recommend that developing countries and their allies consider alternatives to the 
intellectual property system both with respect to the development of medicines and to access.  In 
this regard, treating medicines as global public goods is a particularly attractive theory.  Public 
goods theory imagines that benign and well-funded public institutions can take over the 
supervision of research, development, and manufacture of new drugs for neglected diseases and 
in addition supply large quantities of low cost medicines to poor consumers.150  Although a 
detailed exploration of this and other alternatives to the patent and data exclusivity regime is well 
beyond the scope of this paper, it does behoove public health activists to imagine a world where 
medicines are not guarded by intellectual property rules that present nearly insurmountable 
barriers to both innovation and access.  Despite the attractiveness of such an exploration, 
however, a long-term revolution in intellectual property rules offers little short-term solace for 
tens of millions of people living with diseases today that will kill them tomorrow.  For these 
fellow world citizens pragmatic battles in the thicket of existing rules must also be waged.
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